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De Cive
by Thomas Hobbes1651

Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. OrADissertation Concerning Man in his severall habitudes and respectsas theMember of a Societyfirst Secularand then Sacred. Containing The Elements ofCivill Politie in the Agreement which it hath both with Naturall and DivineLawes. In which is demonstratedBoth what the Origine of Justice isandwherein the Essence of Christian Religion doth consist. Together with TheNatureLimits and Qualifications both of Regiment and Subjection.

By Tho: Hobbes. LondonPrinted by J.C. for R. Roystonat the Angel inIvie-Lane. 1651.

To the Right HonourableWilliamEarle of Devonshire
My most honoured Lord
May it please your Lordship

It was the speech of the Roman people (to whom the name of King had beenrender'd odiousas well by the tyrannie of the Tarquinsas by the Genius andDecretals of that City) 'Twas the speech I say of the publickhoweverpronounced from a private mouth(if yet Cato the Censor were no more then such)That all Kings are to be reckon'd amongst ravenous Beasts. But what a Beast ofprey was the Roman peoplewhilst with its conquering Eagles it erected itsproud Trophees so far and wide over the worldbringing the AfricanstheAsiaticksthe Macedoniansand the Achaeanswith many other despoyled Nationsinto a specious bondagewith the pretence of preferring them to be Denizons ofRome? So that if Cato's saying were a wise one'twas every whit as wise that ofpontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the Companies ofhis Army(in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla) cryed outThatRome her selfeas well as Syllawas to be raz'd; for that there would alwayesbe Wolves and Depraedatours of their Libertyunlesse the Forrest that lodg'dthem were grubb'd up by the roots. To speak impartiallyboth sayings are verytrue; That Man to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant. Wolfe.The first is trueif we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the secondifwe compare Cities. In the onethere's some analogie of similitude with theDeityto witJustice and Charitythe twin-sisters of peace: But in the otherGood men must defend themselves by taking to them for a Sanctuary the twodaughters of WarDeceipt and Violence: that is in plaine termes a meer brutallRapacity: which although men object to one another as a reproachby an inbredcustome which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of othermenwhereinas in a Mirroirall things on the left side appeare to be on theright& all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left; yet thenaturall right of preservation which we all receive from the uncontroulableDictates of Necessitywill not admit it to be a Vicethough it confesse it tobe an Unhappinesse. Now that with Cato himselfe(a person of so great a renownefor wisdome) Animosity should so prevaile instead of Judgementand partialityinstead of Reasonthat the very same thing which he thought equall in hispopular Statehe should censure as unjust in a Monarchicalother men perhapsmay have leisure to admire. But I have been long since of this opinionThatthere was never yet any more-then-vulgar-prudence that had the luck of beingacceptable to the Giddy people; but either it hath not been understoodor elsehaving been sohath been levell'd and cryed downe. The more eminent Actions andApothegms both of the Greeks and Romans have been indebted for their Eulogiesnot so much to the Reasonas to the Greatnesse of themand very many times tothat prosperous usurpation (with which our Histories doe so mutually upbraideach other) which as a conquering Torrent carryes all before itas well publickAgents as publick Actionsin the streame of Time. Wisdome properly so call'd isnothing else but thisThe perfect knowledge of the Truth in all matterswhatsoever. Which being derived from the Registers and Records of Thingsandthat as 'twere through the Conduit of certain definite Appellationscannotpossibly be the work of a suddaine Acutenessebut of a well-ballanc'd Reasonwhich by the Compendium of a wordwe call philosophy. For by this it isthat away is open'd to usin which we travell from the contemplation of particularthings to the Inference or result of universall Actions. Now look how many sortsof things there are which properly fall within the cognizance of humane reasoninto so many branches does the tree of philosophy divide it selfe. And from thediversity of the matter about which they are conversantthere hath been givento those branches a diversity of Names too: For treating of Figurestis call'dGeometry. of motionphysick; of naturall rightMoralls; put all togetherandthey make up philosophy. Just as the Britishthe Atlantickand the Indian Seasbeing diversly christen'd from the diversity of their shoaresdoenotwithstanding all together make up The Ocean. And truly the Geometricians havevery admirably perform'd their part. For whatsoever assistance doth accrew tothe life of manwhether from the observation of the Heavensor from thedescription of the Earthfrom the notation of Timesor from the remotestExperiments of Navigation; Finallywhatsoever things they are in which thispresent Age doth differ from the rude simplenesse of Antiquitywe mustacknowledge to be a debt which we owe meerly to Geometry. If the Morallphilosophers had as happily discharg'd their dutyI know not what could havebeen added by humane Industry to the completion of that happinessewhich isconsistent with humane life. For were the nature of humane Actions as distinctlyknowneas the nature of Quantity in Geometricall Figuresthe strength ofAvarice and Ambitionwhich is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgaras touching the nature of Right and Wrongwould presently faint and languish;And Mankinde should enjoy such an Immortall peacethat (unlesse it were forhabitationon supposition that the Earth should grow too narrow for herInhabitants) there would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on thecontrarythat neither the Sword nor the pen should be allowed any Cessation;That the knowledge of the Law of Nature should lose its growthnot advancing awhit beyond its antient stature; that there should still be such siding with theseverall factions of philosophersthat the very same Action should bee decryedby someand as much elevated by others; that the very same man should atseverall times embrace his severall opinionsand esteem his own Actions farreotherwise in himselfe then he does in others; These I say are so many signessomany manifest Argumentsthat what hath hitherto been written by Morallphilosophershath not made any progress in the knowledge of the Truth; but yethave took with the worldnot so much by giving any light to the understandingas entertainment to the Affectionswhilest by the successefull Rhetoricationsof their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions. Sothat this part of philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the publickWayeswhich lye open to all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lotwith high wayes and open streets; Some for divertisementand some for businesse;so that what with the Impertinencies of someand the Altercations of othersthose wayes have never a seeds timeand therefore yield never a harvest. Theonely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this; That amongst all thewriters of that part of philosophythere is not one that hath used an idoneousprinciple of Tractation: For we may notas in a Circlebegin the handling of aScience from what point we please. There is a certain Clue of Reasonwhosebeginning is in the darkbut by the benefit of whose Conductwee are led as 'twereby the hand into the clearest lightso that the principle of Tractation is tobe taken from that Darknesseand then the light to be carried thither for theirradiating its doubts. As often therefore as any writerdoth either weaklyforsake that Clueor wilfully cut it asunderhe describes the Footstepsnotof his progresse in Sciencebut of his wandrings from it. And upon this it wasthat when I applyed my Thoughts to the Investigation of Naturall JusticeI waspresently advertised from the very word Justice(wich signifies a steady Willof giving every one his Owne) that my first enquiry was to befrom whence itproceededthat any man should call any thing rather his Ownethen another mans.And when I found that this proceeded not from Naturebut Consent(for whatNature at first laid forth in commonmen did afterwards distribute intoseverall ImpropriationsI was conducted from thence to another Inquirynamelyto what endand upon what Impulsiveswhen all was equally every mans incommonmen did rather think it fittingthat every man should have hisInclosure; And I found the reason wasthat from a Community of Goodstheremust needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatestand from thatContention all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensuewhich by the instinctof Natureevery man is taught to shun. Having therefore thus arrived at twomaximes of humane Naturethe one arising from the concupiscible partwhichdesires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all othershave a joynt interestthe other proceeding from the rationallwhich teachesevery man to fly a contre-naturall Dissolutionas the greatest mischiefe thatcan arrive to Nature; Which principles being laid downI seem from them to havedemonstrated by a most evident connexionin this little work of minefirst theabsolute necessity of Leagues and Contractsand thence the rudiments both ofmorall and of civill prudence. That Appendage which is added concerning theRegiment of Godhath been done with this intentthat the Dictates of GodAlmighty in the Law of naturemight not seem repugnant to the written Lawrevealed to us in his word. I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of mydiscoursenot to meddle with the civill Lawes of any particular nationwhatsoeverThat is to sayI have avoyded coming a shorewhich those Timeshave so infested both with shelvesand Tempests. At what expence of time andindustry I have beene in this scrutiny after TruthI am not ignorant; but towhat purposeI know not. For being partiall Judges of our selveswe lay apartiall estimate upon our own productions. I therefore offer up this Book toyour Lordshipsnot favourbut censure firstas having found by manyexperimentsthat it is not the credit of the Authornor the newnesse of theworknor yet the ornament of the stylebut only the weight of Reasonwhichrecommends any Opinion to your Lordships Favour and Approbation. If it fortuneto pleasethat is to sayif it be soundif it be usefullif it be not vulgar;I humbly offer it to your Lordship as both my Gloryand my protection; But ifin any thing I have erredyour Lordship will yet accept it as a Testimony of myGratitudefor that the means of study which I enjoyed by your LordshipsGoodnesseI have employed to the procurement of your Lordships Favour. The Godof Heaven crown your Lordship with length of Dayes in this earthly Stationandin the heavenly Jerusalemwith a crown of Glory.

Your Honours most humbleand most devoted ServantTho. Hobbs.

The Authors Preface to the Reader

ReaderI promise thee here such thingswhich ordinarily promiseddoe seemeto challenge the greatest attentionand I lay them here before thine eyeswhether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated ofor the rightmethod of handling itor the honest motiveand good advice to undertake itorlastly the moderation of the Authour. In this Book thou shalt finde brieflydescribed the duties of menFirst as Menthen as SubjectsLastlyasChristians; under which duties are contained not only the elements of the Lawesof Natureand of Nationstogether with the true originalland power ofJusticebut also the very essence of Christian Religion it selfeso farreforth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it.

Which kinde of doctrine (excepting what relates to Christian Religion) themost antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterityeithercuriously adorned with Verseor clouded with Allegoriesas a most beautifulland hallowed mystery of Royall authority; lest by the disputations of privatemenit might be defiled; Other philosophers in the mean timeto the advantageof mankindedid contemplate the facesand motions of things; otherswithoutdisadvantagetheir naturesand causes. But in after timesSocrates is said tohave been the firstwho truly loved this civill Sciencealthough hitherto notthroughly understoodyet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the governmentof the Common wealeand that he set so great a value on thisthat utterlyabandoningand despising all other parts of philosophyhe wholly embraced thisas judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde. After him comes PlatoAristotleCiceroand other philosophersas well Greekeas Latine. And now atlength all men of all Nationsnot only philosophersbut even the vulgarhaveand doe still deale with this as a matter of easeexposed and prostitute toevery Mother-witand to be attained without any great care or study. And whichmakes mainly for its dignitythose who suppose themselves to have itor are insuch employmentas they ought to have itdoe so wonderfully please themselvesin its Idaeaas they easily brooke the followers of other arts to be esteemedand styled ingenuouslearnedskilfullwhat you will; except prudent: for thisNamein regard of civill knowledgethey presume to be due to themselves onely.Whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of thepersons who entertain themor by the number of those who have written of themor by the judgement of the wisest. certainly this must carry itwhich so neerlyrelates to princesand others engaged in the government of mankindein whoseadulterate Species also the most part of men doe delight themselvesand inwhich the most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant. The benefitof it when rightly delivered (that is) when derived from true principles byevident connexionwe shall then best discernewhen we shall but well haveconsidered the mischiefes that have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit andbabling form; for in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our witsif any errour escape usit is without hurt; neither is there any lossebut oftime onely: but in those things which every man ought to meditate for thesteerage of his lifeit necessarily happensthat not onely from erroursbuteven from ignorance it selfethere arise offencescontentionsnay evenslaughter it selfe. Look nowhow great a prejudice these aresuchand sogreat is the benefit arising from this doctrine of moralitytruly declared. Howmany Kings (and those good men too) hath this one errourThat a Tyrant Kingmight lawfully be put to deathbeen the slaughter of? How many throats haththis false position cutThat a prince for some causes may by some certain menbe deposed? And what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine causedThatKings are not superiours tobut administrators for the multitude? Lastlyhowmany rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of which teacheth that theknowledge whether the commands of Kings be just or unjustbelongs to privatemenand that before they yeeld obediencethey not only maybut ought todispute them? Besidesin the morall philosophy now commonly receivedthere aremany things no lesse dangerous then thosewhich it matters not now to recite. Isuppose those antients foresaw thiswho rather chose to have the Science ofjustice wrapt up in fablesthen openly exposed to disputations: for before suchquestions began to be movedprinces did not sue forbut already exercised thesupreme power. They kept their Empire entirenot by argumentsbut by punishingthe wickedand protecting the good; likewise Subjects did not measure what wasjust by the sayings and judgements of private menbut by the Lawes of theRealme; nor were they kept in peace by disputationsbut by power and authority:yea they reverenced the supreme powerwhether residing in one man or in acouncellas a certain visible divinity; therefore they little used as in ourdayesto joyn themselves with ambitiousand hellish spiritsto the utterruine of their State; for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as notto desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved; in truththesimplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly.Wherefore it was peaceand a golden agewhich ended not before that Saturnbeing expelledit was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings. This I saythe Antients not only themselves sawbut in one of their fablesthey seem veryaptly to have signified it to us; for they saythat when Ixion was invited byJupiter to a banquethe fell in loveand began to court Juno her selfe;offering to embrace herhe clasp't a clowdfrom whence the Centaures proceededby nature halfe menhalfe horsesa fiercea fightingand unquiet generation;which changing the names onlyis as much as if they should have saidthatprivate men being called to Counsels of State desired to prostitute justicetheonely sister and wife of the supremeto their own judgementsand apprehensionsbut embracing a false and empty shadow instead of itthey have begotten thosehermaphrodite opinions of morall philosopherspartly right and comelypartlybrutall and wildethe causes of all contentionsand blood-sheds. Sincetherefore such opinions are daily seen to ariseif any man now shall dispellthose clowdsand by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are noauthenticall doctrines concerning right and wronggood and evillbesides theconstituted Lawes in each Realmeand government; and that the question whetherany future action will prove just or unjustgood or illis to be demanded ofnonebut those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of hisLawes; surely he will not only shew us the high way to peacebut will alsoteach us how to avoyd the closedarkeand dangerous by-paths of faction andseditionthen which I know not what can be thought more profitable.

Concerning my MethodI thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evidentstyle in what I had to deliverexcept I took my begining from the very matterof civill governmentand thence proceeded to its generationand formand thefirst beginning of justice; for every thing is best understood by itsconstitutive causes; for as in a watchor some such small enginethe matterfigureand motion of the wheelescannot well be knownexcept it be taken insunderand viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights ofStatesand duties of Subjectsit is necessary(I say not to take them insunderbut yet that) they be so consideredas if they were dissolved(i.e.)that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature isin whatmatters it isin what not fit to make up a civill governmentand how men mustbe agreed among themselvesthat intend to grow up into a well-grounded State.Having therefore followed this kind of Method; In the first place I set down fora principle by experience known to all menand denied by noneto witthat thedispositions of men are naturally suchthat except they be restrained throughfeare of some coercive powerevery man will distrust and dread each otherandas by naturall right he mayso by necessity he will be forced to make use ofthe strength hee hathtoward the preservation of himself You will objectperhapsthat there are some who deny this; truly so it happensthat very manydo deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against my self because I affirmthat the same men confesseand deny the same thing? In truth I do notbut theydowhose actions disavow what their discourses approve; of We see all countriesthough they be at peace with their neighboursyet guarding their Frontiers witharmed mentheir Townes with Walls and portsand keeping constant watches. Towhat purpose is all thisif there be no feare of the neighbouring power? Weesee even in well-governed Stateswhere there are lawes and punishmentsappointed for offendorsyet particular men travell not without their Sword bytheir sidesfor their defencesneither sleep they without shutting not onlytheir doores against their fellow Subjectsbut also their Trunks and Coffersfor feare of domestiques. Can men give a clearer testimony of the distrust theyhave each of otherand allof all? How since they doe thusand evenCountreyes as well as menthey publiquely professe their mutuall feare anddiffidence; But in disputing they deny itthats as much as to saythat out ofa desire they have to contradict othersthey gainsay themselves. Some objectthat this principle being admittedit would needs follownot onely that allmen were wicked (which perhaps though it seeme hardyet we must yeeld tosinceit is so clearly declar'd by holy writ) but also wicked by nature (which cannotbe granted without impiety). But thisthat men are evill by naturefollowesnot from this principle; for though the wicked were fewer then the righteousyet because we cannot distinguish themthere is a necessity of suspectingheedinganticipatingsubjugatingselfe-defendingever incident to the mosthonestand fairest condition'd; much lesse do's it follow that those who arewicked are so by naturefor though from naturethat is from their first birthas they are meerly sensible Creaturesthey have this dispositionthatimmediately as much as in them liesthey desire and doe whatsoever is bestpleasing to themthat either through feare they fly fromor through hardnesserepell those dangers which approach themyet are they not for this reason to beaccounted wicked; for the affections of the minde which arise onely from thelower parts of the soule are not wicked themselvesbut the actions thenceproceeding may be so sometimesas when they are either offensiveor againstduty. Unlesse you give Children all they aske forthey are peevishand cryIand strike their parents sometimesand all this they have from natureyet arethey free from guiltneither may we properly call them wicked; firstbecausethey cannot hurt; nextbecause wanting the free use of reason they are exemptedfrom all duty; these when they come to riper yeares having acquired powerwhereby they may doe hurtif they shall continue to doe the same thingsthentruly they both begin to beand are properly accounted wicked; In so much as awicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdyor aman of a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of reason inthat agewhen nature ought to be better governed through good education andexperience. Unlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evillbecausethey receive not their education and use of reason from naturewe must needsacknowledge that men may derive desirefeareangerand other passions fromnatureand yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature. Thefoundation therefore which I have laid standing firmeI demonstrate in thefirst placethat the state of men without civill society (which state we mayproperly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a meere warre of allagainst all; and in that warre all men have equall right unto all things; Nextthat all men as soone as they arrive to understanding of this hatefull conditiondoe desire (even nature it selfe compelling them) to be freed from this misery.But that this cannot be done except by compactthey all quitt that right whichthey have unto all things. Furthermore I declareand confirme what the natureof compacts is; how and by what meanes the right of one might be transfer'd untoanother to make their compacts valid; also what rightsand to whom they mustnecessarily be granted for the establishing of peaceI meane what thosedictates of reason arewhich may properly be term'd the Lawes of nature; andall these are contain'd in that part of this booke which I entitle Liberty.

These grounds thus laydI shew farther what civill governmentand thesupreme power in itand the divers kinds of it are; by what meanes it becomesso& what rights particular menwho intend to constitute this civillgovernmentmust so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme powerwhether it be one manor an assembly of menthat except they doe so it willevidently appeare to be no civill governmentbut the rights which all men haveto all thingsthat is the rights of tarre will still remaine. NextIdistinguish the divers kindes of itto witMonarchieAristocratieDemocratieand paternall Dominionand that of Masters over their Servants; I declare howthey are constitutedand I compare their severall conveniences andinconveniences each with. other. furthermoreI unfold what those things arewhich destroy itand what his or their duty is who rule in chiefe. Last of allI explicate the natures of the Lawand of sinneand I distinguish Law fromCounsellfrom compactfrom that which I call Right; all which I comprehendunder the title of Dominion.

In the last part of it which is entituled Religionlest that right which bystrong reason I had confirm'd the Soveraigne powers in the preceding discoursehave over their Subjectsmight seem to be repugnant to the sacred ScripturesIshew in the first place how it repugns not the Divine rightfor as much as Godoverrules all rulers by nature(i.e.) by the Dictates of naturall reason. Inthe secondfor as much as God himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the Jewesby vertue of that antient Covenant of Circumcision. In the thirdbecause Goddoth now rule over us Christians by vertue of our Covenant of Baptisme; andtherefore the authority of Rulers in chiefeor of civill governmentis not atallwe seecontrary to Religion.

In the last place I declare what duties are necessarily requir'd from ustoenter into the Kingdome of Heaven; and of those I plainly demonstrateandconclude out of evident testimonies of holy writaccording to theinterpretation made by allthat the obedience which I have affirm'd to be duefrom particular Christian Subjects unto their Christian princes cannot possiblyin the least sort be repugnant unto Christian Religion. You have seene my Methodreceive now the reason which mov'd me to write this; I was studying philosophiefor my minde sakeand I had gathered together its first Elements in all kindsand having digested them into three Sections by degreesI thought to havewritten them so as in the first I would have treated of a bodyand its generallproperties; in the second of man and his speciall facultiesand affections; inthe thirdof civill government and the duties of Subjects: therefore the firstSection would have contained the first philosophieand certaine elements ofphysick; in it we would have considered the reasons of TimePlaceCausePowerRelationProportionQuantityFigureand motion. In the second wewould have beene conversant about imaginationMemoryintellectratiocinationappetitetillgood and Evillhonest and dishonestand the like. what thislast Section handlesI have now already shewed you. Whilest I contriveorderpensively and slowly compose these mattersfor I onely doe reasonI disputenotit so happen'd in the interimthat my Country some few yeares before thecivill tarres did ragewas boyling hot with questions concerning the rights ofDominionand the obedience due from Subjectsthe true forerunners of anapproaching tar. And was the cause which (all those other matters deferr'd)ripen'dand pluckt from me this third part. Therefore it happens that what waslast in orderis yet come forth first in timeand the ratherbecause I sawthat grounded on its owne principles sufficiently knowne by experience it wouldnot stand in need of the former Sections. I have not yet made it out of a desireof praise (although if I hadI might have defended my selfe with this faireexcusethat very few doe things laudablywho are not affected withcommendation) but for your sakes Readerswho I perswaded my selfewhen youshould rightly apprehend and throughly understand this Doctrine I here presentyou withwould rather chuse to brooke with patience some inconveniences undergovernment (because humane affairs cannot possibly be without some) then selfeopiniatedly disturb the quiet of the publique; Thatweighing the justice ofthose things you are aboutnot by the perswasion and advise of private menbutby the Lawes of the Realmeyou will no longer suffer ambitious men through thestreames of your blood to wade to their owne power; That you will esteeme itbetter to enjoy your selves in the present state though perhaps not the bestthen by waging tarreindeavour to procure a reformation for other men inanother ageyour selves in the meane while either kill'dor consumed with age;Farthermorefor those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civillMagistrateand will be exempt from all publique burthensand yet will liveunder his Jurisdictionand look for protection from the violence and injuriesof othersthat you would not looke on them as fellow Subjectsbut esteeme themfor enemiesand spiesand that yee rashly admit not for Gods Word all whicheither openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so. I say more plainlyifany preacherConfessoror Casuistshal but say that this doctrin is agreeablewith Gods wordnamelyThat the chief rulernay any private man may lawfullybe put to death without the chiefes commandor that Subjects may resistconspireor covenant against the supreme powerthat ye by no means beleevethembut instantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasonswillalso like my intention in writing this book.

Last of alI have propounded to my self this rule through this wholediscourse; Firstnot to define ought which concerns the justice of singleactionsbut leave them to be determined by the laws. Next not to dispute thelaws of any government in specialthat isnot to point which are the laws ofany countrybut to declare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly not toseem of opinionthat there is a lesse proportion of for obedience due to anAristocraty or Democratythen a Monarchy; though I have endeavoured byarguments in my tenth Chapter to gain a belief in menthat Monarchy is the mostcommodious government (which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book notto be demonstratedbut only probably stated) yet every where I expresly saythat in all kind of Government whatsoeverthere ought to be a supreme andequall power. Fourthlynot in any wise to dispute the positions of Divinesexcept those which strip Subjects of their obedienceand shake the foundationsof civill government. Lastlylest I might imprudently set forth somewhat ofwhich there would be no needwhat I had thus writtenI would not presentlyexpose to publique interestwherefore I got some few copies privately disperstamong some of my friendsthat discrying the opinions of othersif any thingsappeared erroneoushardor obscureI might correctsoftenand explain them.

These things I found most bitterly excepted against: that I had made thecivill powers too largebut this by Ecclesiasticall persons; that I had utterlytaken away liberty of consciencebut this by Sectaries; that I had set princesabove the civil Lawsbut this by Lawyers; wherefore I was not much moved bythese mens reprehensions(as who in doing this did but do their own business)except it were tye those knots so much faster.

But for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the principlesthemselvesto wit the nature of menthe authority or right of naturethenature of compacts and contractsand the originall of civill governmentbecause in finding fault they have not so much followed their passionsas theircommon senseI have therefore in some places added some annotations whereby Ipresumed I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts; Lastly Ihave endevoured to offend none beside those whose principles these contradictand whose tender mindes are lightly offended by every difference of opinions.

Wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpnesseand lesse of certainty then they ought to havesince they are not so muchspoken for the maintenance of partiesas the establishment of peaceand by onewhose just grief for the present calamities of his countrymay very charitablybe allowed some libertyit is his only request to ye Readersye will deign toreceive them with an equall mind.

Chapter One
Of the state of men without Civill Society

I. The faculties of Humane nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds;Bodily strengthExperienceReasonPassion. Taking the beginning of thisfollowing Doctrine from thesewe will declare in the first place what manner ofinclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare towards each otherand whetherand by what facultythey are born apt for Societyand so preservethemselves against mutuall violence; then proceedingwe will shew what advicewas necessary to be taken for this businesseand what are the conditions ofSocietyor of Humane Peace; that is to say(changing the words onely) what arethe fundamentall Lawes of Nature.

II. The greatest part of those men who have written oughtconcerning Commonwealthseither supposeor require usor beg of us to believeThat Man is a Creature born fit for Society: The Greeks call him Zoon politikonand on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of Civill Societyas iffor the preservation of Peaceand the Government of Man-kind there were nothingelse necessarythen that Men should agree to make certaine Covenants andConditions togetherwhich themselves should then call Lawes. Which Axiomthough received by mostis yet certainly Falseand an Errour proceeding fromour too slight contemplation of Humane Nature; for they who shall more narrowlylook into the Causes for which Men come togetherand delight in each otherscompanyshall easily find that this happens not because naturally it couldhappen no otherwisebut by Accident: For if by nature one Man should Loveanother (that is) as Manthere could no reason be return'd why every Man shouldnot equally Love every Manas being equally Manor why he should ratherfrequent those whose Society affords him Honour or Profit. We doe not thereforeby nature seek Society for its own sakebut that we may receive some Honour orProfit from it; these we desire Primarilythat Secondarily: How by what adviceMen doe meetwill be best known by observing those things which they doe whenthey are met: For if they meet for Traffiqueit's plaine every man regards nothis Fellowbut his Businesse; if to discharge some Officea certainMarket-friendship is begottenwhich hath more of Jealousie in it then Trueloveand whence Factions sometimes may arisebut Good will never; if forPleasureand Recreation of mindevery man is wont to please himself most withthose things which stirre up laughterwhence he may (according to the nature ofthat which is Ridiculous) by comparison of another mans Defects and Infirmitiespasse the more currant in his owne opinion; and although this be sometimesinnocentand without offence; yet it is manifest they are not so much delightedwith the Societyas their own Vain glory. But for the most partin these kindof meetingswe wound the absent; their whole lifesayingsactions areexamin'djudg'dcondemn'd; nayit is very rarebut some present receive afling before they partso as his reason was not illwho was wont alwayes atparting to goe out last. And these are indeed the true delights of Societyuntowhich we are carryed by nature(i.e.) by those passions which are incident toall Creaturesuntill either by sad experienceor good preceptsit so fall out(which in many never happens) that the Appetiteof present mattersbe dul'dwith the memory of things pastwithout whichthe discourse of most quick andnimble menon this subjectis but cold and hungry.

But if it so happenthat being metthey passe their time in relating someStoriesand one of them begins to tell one which concernes himselfe; instantlyevery one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too. if onerelate some wonderthe rest will tell you miraclesif they have themif notthey'l fein them: Lastlythat I may say somewhat of them who pretend to bewiser then others; if they meet to talk of Philosophylook how many mensomany would be esteem'd Mastersor else they not only love not their fellowesbut even persecute them with hatred: So clear is it by experience to all men whoa little more narrowly consider Humane affairesthat all free congress arisetheither from mutual povertyor from vain glorywhence the parties metendeavour to carry with them either some benefitor to leave behind them thatsame some esteem and honour with thosewith whom they have been conversant: Thesame is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselvesof WillGoodHonourProfitable. For when we voluntarily contract Societyin allmanner of Society we look after the object of the Willi.e. thatwhich everyone of thosewho gather togetherpropounds to himselfe for good; nowwhatsoever seemes goodis pleasantand relates either to the sensesor themindbut all the mindes pleasure is either Glory(or to have a good opinion ofones selfe) or referres to Glory in the end; the rest are Sensuallor conducingto sensualitywhich may be all comprehended under the word Conveniencies. AllSociety therefore is either for Gainor for Glory; (i.e.) not so much for loveof our Fellowesas for love of our Selves: but no society can be greatorlastingwhich begins from Vain Glory; because that Glory is like Honourif allmen have itno man hath itfor they consist in comparison and precellence;neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying inmy selfe; for every man must account himselfsuch as he can make himselfewithout the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be muchfarthered by mutuall helpsince yet those may be better attain'd to byDominionthen by the society of others: I hope no body will doubt but that menwould much more greedily be carryed by Natureif all fear were removedtoobtain Dominionthen to gaine Society. We must therefore resolvethat theOriginall of all greatand lasting Societiesconsisted not in the mutuall goodwill men had towards each otherbut in the mutuall fear they had of each other.

 

Born fit

Since we now see actually a constituted Society among menand none livingout of itsince we discern all desirous of congresseand mutuallcorrespondenceit may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidityto lay in the verythreshold of this Doctrinesuch a stumbling block before t he Readersas todeny Man to be born fit for Society: Therefore I must more plainly sayThat itis true indeedthat to Manby natureor as Manthat isas soone as he isbornSolitude is an enemy; for Infants have need of others to help them toliveand those of riper years to help them to live wellwherefore I deny notthat men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civill Societiesare not meer Meetingsbut Bondsto the making whereofFaith and Compacts arenecessary: The Vertue whereof to Childrenand Foolesand the profit whereof tothose who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defectsisaltogether unknown; whence it happensthat thosebecause they know not whatSociety iscannot enter into it; thesebecause ignorant of the benefit itbringscare not for it. Manifest therefore it isthat all menbecause theyare born in Infancyare born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men)either through defect of mindeor want of education remain unfit during thewhole course of their lives; yet have Infantsas well as those of riper yearsan humane nature; wherefore Man is made fit for Society not by Naturebut byEducation: furthermorealthough Man were born in such a condition as to desireitit followes notthat he therefore were Born fit to enter into it; for it isone thing to desireanother to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for eventheywho through their pridewill not stoop to equall conditionswithoutwhich there can be no Societydo yet desire it.

 

The mutuall fear

It is objected: It is so improbable that men should grow into civillSocieties out of fearthat if they had been afraidthey would not have endur'deach others looks: They PresumeI believethat to fear is nothing else then tobe affrighted: I comprehend in this word Feara certain foresight of futureevill; neither doe I conceive flight the sole property of fearbut to distrustsuspecttake heedprovide so that they may not fearis also incident to thefearfull. They who go to Sleepshut their Dores; they who Travell carry theirSwords with thembecause they fear Theives. Kingdomes guard their Coasts andFrontiers with Fortsand Castles; Cities are compast with Wallsand all forfear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes; even the strongest Armiesand mostaccomplisht for Fightyet sometimes Parly for Peaceas fearing each othersPowerand lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men securethemselvesby flight indeedand in cornersif they think they cannot escaPeotherwisebut for the most part by Armesand Defensive Weapons; whence ithappensthat daring to come forththey know each others Spirits; but thenifthey fightCivill Society ariseth from the Victoryif they agreefrom theirAgreement.

III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturallequality of menpartly in their mutuall will of hurting: whence it comes topasse that we can neither expect from othersnor promise to our selves theleast security: For if we look on men fullgrownand consider how brittle theframe of our humane body is(which perishingall its strengthvigourandwisdome it selfe perisheth with it) and how easie a matter it iseven for theweakest man to kill the strongestthere is no reason why any man trusting tohis own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they areequalls who can doe equall things one against the other; but they who can do thegreatest things(namely kill) can doe equall things. All men therefore amongthemselves are by nature equall; the inequality we now discernhath its springfrom the Civill Law.

IV. All men in the State of nature have a desireand will to hurtbut not proceeding from the same causeneither equally to be condemn'd; for oneman according to that naturall equality which is among uspermits as much toothersas he assumes to himself (which is an argument of a temperate manandone that rightly values his power); anothersupposing himselfe above otherswill have a License to doe what he listsand challenges Respectand Honourasdue to him before others(which is an Argument of a fiery spirit:) This manswill to hurt ariseth from Vain gloryand the false esteeme he hath of his ownestrength; the other'sfrom the necessity of defending himselfehis libertyand his goods against this mans violence.

V. Furthermoresince the combate of Wits is the fiercestthegreatest discords which aremust necessarily arise from this Contention; for inthis case it is not only odious to contend againstbut also not to consent; fornot to approve of what a man saith is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of anErrour in that thing which he speaketh; as in very many things to dissentis asmuch as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from; which may appearhencethat there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the sameReligionand Factions of the same Commonwealewhere the Contestation is Eitherconcerning Doctrinesor Politique Prudence. And since all the pleasureandjollity of the mind consists in this; even to get somewith whom comparingitmay find somewhat wherein to Tryumphand Vaunt it self; its impossible but menmust declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughteror byWordsor by Gestureor some signe or other. then which there is no greatervexation of mind; and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greaterdesire to doe hurt.

VI. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each otherariseth hencethat many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing;which yet very often they can neither enjoy in commonnor yet divide it; whenceit followes that the strongest must have itand who is strongest must bedecided by the Sword.

VII. Among so many dangers thereforeas the naturall lusts of mendo daily threaten each other withallto have a care of ones selfe is not amatter so scornfully to be lookt uponas if so be there had not been a powerand will left in one to have done otherwise; for every man is desirous of whatis good for himand shuns what is evillbut chiefly the chiefest of naturallevillswhich is Death; and this he dothby a certain impulsion of naturenolesse then that whereby a Stone moves downward: It is therefore neither absurdnor reprehensible; neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to useall his endeavours to preserve and defend his Bodyand the Members thereof fromdeath and sorrowes; but that which is not contrary to right reasonthat all menaccount to be done justlyand with right; Neither by the word Right is anything else signifiedthen that liberty which every man hath to make use of hisnaturall faculties according to right reason: Therefore the first foundation ofnaturall Right is thisThat every man as much as in him lies endeavour toprotect his life and members.

VIII. But because it is in vaine for a man to have a Right to theendif the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him; it followesthat sinceevery man hath a Right to preserve himselfhe must also be allowed a Right touse all the meansand do all the actionswithout wHich He cannot Preservehimself

IX. Now whether the means which he is about to useand the actionhe is performingbe necessary to the preservation of his Lifeand Membersornothe Himselfby the right of naturemust be judg; for say another manjudgthat it is contrary to right reason that I should judg of mine own perill: whynowbecause he judgeth of what concerns meby the same reasonbecause we areequall by naturewill I judge also of things which doe belong to him; thereforeit agrees with right reason (that is) it is the right of nature that I judge ofhis opinion(i.e.) whether it conduce to my preservationor not.

X. Nature hath given to every one a right to all. That is it waslawfull for every man in the bare state of natureor before such time as menhad engag'd themselves by any Covenantsor Bondsto doe what hee wouldandagainst whom he thought fitand to possesseuseand enjoy all what he wouldor could get. Now because whatsoever a man wouldit therefore seems good to himbecause he wills itand either it really dothor at least seems to him tocontribute toward his preservation(but we have already allowed him to be judgein the foregoing Article whether it doth or notin so much as we are to holdall for necessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so) and by the 7. Article itappeares that by the right of Nature those things may be doneand must be hadwhich necessarily conduce to the protection of lifeand membersit followesthat in the state of natureTo have alland do all is lawfull for all. Andthis is that which is meant by that common sayingNature hath given all to allfrom whence we understand likewisethat in the state of natureProfit is themeasure of Right.

 

In the meere state of Nature

This is thus to be understood: What any man does in the bare state of Natureis injurious to no man; not that in such a State he cannot offend Godor breakthe Lawes of Nature; for Injustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawessuchas in the State of Nature there are none: Now the truth of this proposition thusconceived is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindfull Reader in the Articlesimmediately foregoing; but because in certaine cases the difficulty of theconclusion makes us forget the premisesI will contract this Argumentand makeit most evident to a single view; every man hath right to protect himselfasappears by the seventh Article. The same man therefore hath a right to use allthe means which necessarily conduce to this end by the eight Article: But thoseare the necessary means which he shall judge to be such by the ninth Article. Hetherefore hath a right to make useof and to doe all whatsoever he shall judgerequisite for his preservation: wherefore by the judgement of him that doth itthe thing done is either rightor wrong; and therefore right. True it istherefore in the bare State of Nature&c but if any man pretend somewhat totend necessarily to his preservationwhich yet he himself doth not confidentlybelieve sohe may offend against the Lawes of Natureas in the third Chapterof this Book is more at large declar'd. It hath been objected by some: If aSonne kill his Fatherdoth he him no injury? I have answeredThat a Sonnecannot be understood to be at any time in the State of Natureas being underthe Power and command of them to whom he ownes his protection as soon as ever heis bornnamely either his Fathersor his Mothersor his that nourisht himasis demonstrated in the ninth Chapter.

XI. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a commonRight to all things; for the effects of this Right are the samealmostas ifthere had been no Right at all; for although any man might say of every thingThis is mineyet could he not enjoy itby reason of his Neighbourwho havingequall Rightand equall powerwould pretend the same thing to be his.

XII. If now to this naturall proclivity of mento hurt each otherwhich they derive from their Passionsbut chiefly from a vain esteeme ofthemselves: You addethe right of all to allwherewith one by right invadesthe other by right resistsand whence arise perpetuall jealousies andsuspicions on all handsand how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemyinvading uswith an intention to oppresseand ruinethough he come with asmall Numberand no great Provision;. it cannot be deny'd but that the naturallstate of menbefore they entr'd into Societywas a meer Warand that notsimplybut a War of all menagainst all men; for what is WARbut that sametime in which the will of contesting by forceis fully declar'd either by Wordsor Deeds? The time remainingis termed PEACE.

XIII. But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to thepreservation either of Man-kindor of each single Mana perpetuall War is: Butit is perpetuall in its own naturebecause in regard of the equality of thosethat striveit cannot be ended by Victory; for in this state the Conquerour issubject to so much dangeras it were to be accounted a Miracleif anyeventhe most strong should close up his life with many yearsand old age. They ofAmerica are Examples hereofeven in this present Age: Other Nations have beenin former Ageswhich now indeed are become Civilland Flourishingbut werethen fewfierceshort-livedpoornastyand destroy'd of all that Pleasureand Beauty of lifewhich Peace and Society are wont to bring with them.Whosoever therefore holdsthat it had been best to have continued in that statein which all things were lawfull for all menhe contradicts himself; for everymanby naturall necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there anythat esteemes a war of all against allwhich necessarily adheres to such aStateto be good for him. And so it happens that through feare of each other wethink it fit to rid our selves of this conditionand to get some fellowes; thatif there needs must be warit may not yet be against all mennor without somehelps.

XIV. Fellowes are gotten either by constraintor by consent; ByConstraintwhen after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him eitherthrough feare of deathor by laying fetters on him: By consentwhen men enterinto society to helpe each otherboth parties consenting without any constraint.But the Conqueror may by right compell the Conqueredor the strongest theweaker(as a man in health may one that is sickor he that is of riper yearesa childe) unlesse he will choose to dieto give caution of his future obedience.For since the right of protecting our selves according to our owne willsproceeded from our dangerand our danger from our equalityits more consonantto reasonand more certaine for our conservationusing the present advantageto secure our selves by taking caution; thenwhen they shall be full growne andstrongand got out of our powerto endeavour to recover that power againe bydoubtfull fight. And on the other sidenothing can be thought more absurdthenby discharging whom you already have weak in your powerto make him at onceboth an enemyand a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as aCorollarie in the naturall state of menThat a sure and irresistible Powerconfers the right of Dominionand ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuchas the right of all thingsthat can be doneadheres essentiallyandimmediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.

XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thusin the state of nature (i.e.) of Warby reason of that equality of powerandother humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peacewherethere is any hopes of obtaining itand where there is noneto enquire out forAuxiliaries of Waris the dictate of right Reason; that isthe Law of Natureas shall be shewed in the next Chapter.

Chap. II. Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts.

I. All Authors agree not concerning the definition of the NaturallLawwho notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their Writings.The Method thereforewherein we begin from definitionsand exclusion of allequivocationis only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes;for the restif any man saythat somwhat is done against the Law of Natureone proves it hencebecause it was done against the generall Agreement of allthe most wiseand learned Nations: But this declares not who shall be the judgof the wisdome and learning of all Nations: Another henceThat it was doneagainst the Generall consent of all Man-kind; which definition is by no means tobe admitted; for then it were impossible for any but Childrenand Foolstooffend against such a Law; for sureunder the notion of Man-kindtheycomprehend all men actually endued with Reason. These therefore either doeNaught against itor if they doe Oughtit is without their joint accordandtherefore ought to be excus'd; but to receive the Lawes of Nature from theConsents of themwho oftner Breakthen Observe themis in truth unreasonable:besidesMen condemne the same things in otherswhich they approve inthemselves; on the other sidethey publickly commend what they privatelycondemne; and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear-saythen any Speculationof their own; and they accord more through hatred of some objectthrough fearhopeloveor some other perturbation of mindthen true Reason. And thereforeit comes to passethat whole Bodyes of people often doe those things byGenerall accordor Contentionwhich those Writers most willingly acknowledgeto be against the Law of Nature. But since all doe grant that is done by RIGHTwhich is not done against Reasonwe ought to judg those Actions onely wrongwhich are repugnant to right Reason(i.e.) which contradict some certaine Truthcollected by right reasoning from true Principles; but that Wrong which is donewe say it is done against some Law: therefore True Reason is a certaine Lawwhich (since it is no lesse a part of Humane naturethen any other facultyoraffection of the mind) is also termed naturall. Therefore the Law of Naturethat I may define itis the Dictate of right Reasonconversant about thosethings which are either to be doneor omitted for the constant preservation ofLifeand Membersas much as in us lyes.

Right Reason.

By Right Reason in the naturall state of menI understand notas many doean infallible facultybut the act of reasoningthat isthe peculiar and trueratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may eitherredound to the dammageor benefit of his neighbours. I call it Peculiarbecause although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e. theCivill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet beingwithout this Civill Government(in which state no man can know right reasonfrom falsebut by comparing it with His owne) every mans owne reason is to beaccounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are done at His owneperillbut also for the measure of another mans reasonin such things as doeconcerne him. I call it True; that isconcluding from true principles rightlyfram'dbecause that the wHole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in thefalse reasoningor rather folly of those men who see not those duties they arenecessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation; butthe Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which areexplained in the 23456and 7. articles of the first Chapter.

II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature isThat Peace isto be sought after where it may be found; and where notthere to provide ourselves for helps of War: For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoingChapterthat this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the Dictatesof right reason are naturall Lawesthat hath been newly prov'd above; But thisis the firstbecause the rest are deriv'd from thisand they direct the wayeseither to Peaceor self-defence.

III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentallone is thisThat the right of all mento all thingsought not to be retain'dbut that some certain rights ought to be transferr'dor relinquisht: for ifevery one should retain his right to all thingsit must necessarily followthat some by right might invade; and othersby the same rightmight defendthemselves against them(for every manby naturall necessityendeavours todefend his Bodyand the things which he judgeth necessary towards theprotection of his Body) therefore War would follow. He therefore acts againstthe reason of Peace(i.e.) against the Law of Naturewhosoever he bethatdoth not part with his Right to all things.

IV. But he is said to part with his rightwho either absolutelyrenounceth itor conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth itwho bysome sufficient Signeor meet Tokensdeclares that he is willing that it shallnever be lawfull for him to doe that againwhich beforeby Righthe mighthave done; but he conveys it to anotherwho by some sufficient Signeor meetTokensdeclares to that otherthat he is willing it should be unlawfull forhim to resist himin going about to do somewhat in the performance where hemight beforewith Righthave resisted him; but that the conveyance of Rightconsists meerly in not resistingis understood by thisthat before it wasconvey'dheto whom he convey'd ithad even then also a right to allwhencehe could not give any new Right: But the resisting Right he hadbefore he gaveitby reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rightsis utterlyabolisht: Whosoever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of menhe onely procures himself securityand freedome from just molestation in theenjoyment of his Primitive Right: As for exampleif any man shall sellor giveaway a Farmehe utterly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farmebuthe does not so from others also.

V. But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onelyof him that conveysbut of him also that accepts it. If either be wantingtheRight remaines: for if I would have given what was mineto one who refus'd toaccept of itI have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Rightor convey'dit to any man; for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this Man was inhim onelynot in others too.

VI. But if there be no other Token extant of our will either toquitor convey our Rightbut onely Words; those words must either relate tothe presentor time past; for if they be of the future onelythey conveynothing: for examplehe that speaks thus of the time to comeI will give tomorrowdeclares openly that yet he hath not given it; so that all this day hisright remainsand abides to morrow toounlesse in the interim he actuallybestowes it: for what is mineremains mine till I have parted with it. But if Ishall speak of the time presentsuppose thus; I doe giveor have given youthis to be received to morrowby these words is signified that I have alreadygiven itand that his Right to receive it to morrowis conveyed to him by meto day.

VII. Neverthelessealthough words alone are not sufficient tokensto declare the Will; if yet to words relating to the futurethere shall someother signes be addedthey may become as validas if they had been spoken ofthe present: If thereforeas by reason of those other signesit appearthathe that speaks of the futureintends those words should be effectuall towardthe perfect transferring of his Rightthey ought to be valid; for theconveyance of right depends not on wordsbut (as hath been instanc'd in the 4.Article) on the declaration of the Will.

VIII. If any man conveigh some part of his right to anotheranddoth not this for some certain benefit receivedor for some compactaconveighance in this kind is called a Giftor free Donation. But in freedonation those words onely oblige us which signifie the presentor the timepast; for if they respect the futurethey oblige not as wordsfor the reasongiven in the foregoing Article: It must needs therefore bethat the Obligationarise from some other tokens of the Will: Butbecause whatsoever is voluntarilydoneis done for some good to him that wils it; there can no other token beassigned of the Will to give itexcept some benefit either already receiv'dorto be acquir'd; but is suppos'dthat no such benefit is acquirednor anycompact in being; for if soit would cease to be a free gift: It remainsthereforethat a mutuall good turne without agreement be expected; but no signecan be giventhat hewho us' d future words toward him who was in no sortengag'd to return a benefitshould desire to have his words so understoodasto oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reasonthat those who areeasily enclined to doe well to othersshould be oblig'd by every promisetestifying their present good affection: And for this causea promiser in thiskindmust be understood to have time to deliberateand power to change thataffection as well as he to whom he made that promisemay alter his desert. Buthe that deliberatesis so farre forth freenor can be said to have alreadygiven: But if he promise oftenand yet give seldomehe ought to be condemn'dof levityand be called not a Donourbut Doson.

IX. But the act of twoor moremutually conveighing their Rightsis call'd a Contract. But in every Contracteither both parties instantlyperforme what they contract forinsomuch as there is no trust had from eitherto other; or the one performesthe other is trustedor neither performe. Whereboth parties performe presentlythere the Contract is endedas soon as 'tisperformed; but where there is credit given either to oneor boththere theparty trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called aCOVENANT.

X. But the Covenant made by the party trusted with himwho hathalready performedalthough the promise be made by words pointing at the futuredoth no lesse transfer the right of future timethen if it had been made bywords signifying the presentor time past: for the others performance is a mostmanifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trustedas thathe would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by thissigne the party trusted knew himselfe to be thus understoodwhichbecause hehindred not'twas an evident token of his Will to performe. The promisestherefore which are made for some benefit received (which are also Covenants)are Tokens of the Will; that is(as in the foregoing Section hath been declared)of the last act of deliberatingwhereby the liberty of non-performance isabolishtand by consequence are obligatory; for where Liberty ceaseththerebeginneth Obligation.

XI. But the Covenantswhich are made in contract of mutualltrustneither party performing out of handif there arise a just suspicion ineither of themare in the state of nature invalid: for he that first performesby reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying theirowne advantageeither by rightor wrongexposeth himself to the perverse willof him with whom he hath Contracted; for it suites not with reasonthat any manshould performe firstif it be not likely that the other will make good hispromise after; whichwhether it be probableor nothe that doubts itmust bejudge ofas hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 9. Article. ThusI saythings stand in the state of naturebut in a Civill Statewhen there isa power which can compell both partieshe that hath contracted to performfirstmust first performe; becausethat since the other may be compell'dthecause which made him fear the others non-performanceceaseth.

Arise

Forexcept there appear some new cause of feareither from somewhat doneor some other token of the till not to performe from the other partit cannotbe judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep himfrom making Compactmust not suffice to authorize the breach of itbeing made.

XII. But from this reasonthat in all Free-giftsand Compactsthere is an acceptance of the conveighance of Right required: it followesthatno man can Compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance; and thereforewe cannot compact with Beastsneither can we giveor take from them any mannerof Rightby reason of their want of speechand understandingNeither can anyman Covenant with Godor be oblig'd to him by Vowexcept so far forth as itappeares to him by Holy Scripturesthat he hath substituted certaine men whohave authority to accept of such like Vowes and Covenantsas being in Godsstead.

XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vainwho are in the state ofnaturewhere they are not tyed by any Civill Law(except by most certainRevelation the Will of God to accept their Vowor Pactbe made known to them)for if what they Vowbe contrary to the Law of Naturethey are not tyed bytheir Vowfor no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act; but if what is vowedbe commanded by some Law of natureit is not their Vowbut the Law it selfwhich ties them; but if he were free before his voweither to doe itor notdoe ithis liberty remainesbecause that the openly declar'd Will of theobliger is requisite to make an obligation by Vowwhich in the case propoundedis suppos'd not to be: Now I call him the Obliger to whom any one is tyedandthe Obliged him who is tyed.

XIV. Covenants are made of such things onely as fall under ourdeliberationfor it can be no Covenant without the Will of the Contractorbutthe Will is the last act of him who deliberates; therefore they onely concernethings possibleand to come; no man thereforeby his Compactobligeth himselfto an impossibility. But yetthough we often Covenant to doe such things asthen seem' d possible when we promis'd themwhich yet afterward appear to beimpossibleare we therefore freed from all obligation? The reason whereof isthat he who promiseth a future incertainty receives a present benefit; onconditionthat he return another for it: for his Willwho performes thepresent benefit hath simply before itfor its objecta certain good valuablewith the thing promised; but the thing it selfe not simplybut with conditionif it could be done; but if it should so happenthat even this should proveimpossiblewhy then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants thereforeoblige us not to perform just the thing it selfe covenanted forbut our utmostendeavour. for this onely isthe things themselves are not in our power.

XV. We are freed from Covenants two wayeseither by performingor by being forgiven: By performingfor beyond that we oblig'd not our selves.By being for-givenbecause he whom we oblig'd our selves to by forgivingisconceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to him; forforgivingimplies giving: that isby the fourth Article of this Chaptera conveyance ofRight to him to whom the gift is made.

XVI. Its an usuall questionWhether Compacts extorted from usthrough feardo obligeor not: For exampleIf to redeeme my lifefrom thepower of a RobberI promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and that I will doe noact whereby to apprehendand bring him to Justicewhether I am tyed to keeppromiseor not? But though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of noeffectyet it is not to be accounted sobecause it proceeded from fearforthen it would follow that those promises which reduc'd men to a civill lifeandby which Lawes were mademight likewise be of none effect(for it proceedsfrom fear of mutuall slaughterthat one man submits himselfe to the Dominion ofanother:) And he should play the fool finelywho should trust his captivecovenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally truethatpromises doe oblige when there is some benefit received; and that to promiseeand the thing promisedbe lawfull: But it is lawfullfor the redemption of mylifeboth to promiseand to give what I will of mine owne to any maneven toa Thief. We are oblig'd therefore. by promises proceeding from fearexcept theCivill Law forbid themby vertue whereofthat which is promised becomesunlawfull.

XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doeor omit somewhatand shall after Covenant the contrary with another; he maketh not the formerbut the latter Contract unlawfull: forhe hath no longer Right to doeor toomit oughtwho by former Contracts hath conveyed it to another; wherefore hecan conveigh no Right by latter Contractsand what is promisedis promis'dwithout Right: He is therefore tyed onely to his first Contract; to break whichis unlawfull.

XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resisthim who shall offer to killwoundor any other way hurt his Body; for there isin every man a certain high degree of feare through which he apprehends thatevill which is done to him to be the greatestand therefore by naturallnecessity he shuns it all he canand 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise:When a man is arrived to this degree of fearwe cannot expect but he willprovide for himself either by flightor fight. Since therefore no man is tyedto impossibilitiesthey who are threatned either with deathe (which is thegreatest evill to nature) or woundsor some other bodily hurtsand are notstout enough to bear themare not obliged to endure them. Farthermorehe thatis tyed by Contract is trusted(for Faith only is the Bond of Contracts) butthey who are brought to punishmenteither Capitallor more gentlearefetteredor strongly guardedwhich is a most certain signe that they seem' dnot sufficiently bound from non resistance by their Contracts. Its one thing ifI promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointedkill me. Another thing ifthus: If I doe it notthough you should offer to kill meI will not resist:All menif need becontract the first way; but there is need sometimes. Thissecond waynoneneither is it ever needfull; for in the meer state of natureif you have a mind to killthat state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch asyou need not first trust himif for breach of trust you will afterward kill him.But in a Civill Statewhere the Right of lifeand deathand of all corporallpunishment is with the Supreme; that same Right of killing cannot be granted toany private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe contract with any manpatiently to yeeld to his punishmentbut onely thisthat no man offer todefend others from him. If in the state of natureas between two Citiesthereshould a Contract be madeon condition of killingif it were not perform'dwemust presuppose another Contract of not killing before the appointed day.Wherefore on that dayif there be no performancethe right of Warre returnes;that isan hostile statein which all things are lawfulland thereforeresistance also. Lastlyby the contract of not resistingwe are oblig'd of twoEvills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for certaine Death is agreater evill then Fighting; but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse theleast: By such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilitieswhichis contrary to the very nature of compacts.

XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accusehimselfor any otherby whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a bitterlife; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear witnesse against his Sonnenor a Husband against his Wifenor a Sonne against his Father; nor any managainst any oneby whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is thattestimony which is presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but although no man betyed to accuse himself by any compactyet in a publique tryall he maybytorturebe forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony of the factbut helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'dhis answer be trueor falseor whether he answer not at allwhatsoever hedothhe doth it by Right.

XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promisewhereby the promiserdeclares his renouncing of Gods mercyunlesse he perform his word; whichdefinition is contained in the words themselveswhich have in them the veryessence of an Oathto witso God help meor other equivalentas with theRomansDoe thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiveras I slay this same Beast:neither is this any letbut that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatoryas promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an Oathpromiseththat he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjectsto Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall henceThat those Kingstook upon them Divine Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that byReligionand consideration of the Divine Power men might have a greater dreadof breaking their Faithsthen that wherewith they fear menfrom whose eyestheir actions may lie hid.

XXI. Whence it followesthat an Oath must be conceived in thatforme which he usethwho takes it; for in vain is any man brought to Swear by aGod whom he beleeves notand therefore neither feares him. For though by thelight of nature it may be known that there is a Godyet no man thinks he is toSwear by him in any other fashionor by any other name then what is contain'din the precepts of his own properthat is(as he who Swears imagines) the trueReligion.

XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understandthat a bareContract obligeth no lessethen that to which we are Sworn; for it is thecontract which binds usthe Oath relates to the Divine punishmentwhich itcould not provokeif the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull;but it could not be unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Furthermorehe that renounceth the mercy of God obligeth himselfe not to any punishmentbecause it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment howsoever provok'dandto enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath isthisTo cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faiththrough fear of punishmentto make the more Conscience of their words andactions.

XXIII. To exact an Oathwhere the breach of contractif any bemadecannot but be knownand where the party compactedwithall wants notpower to punishis to do somewhat more then is necessary unto self-defenceandshewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfeas to prejudice another.For an Oathout of the very form of swearingis taken in order to theprovocation of Gods angerthat is to sayof him that is Omnipotent againstthose who thinkthat by their own therefore violate their Faithbecause theystrength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscientagainst thosewho therefore usually break their trustbecause they hope thatno man shall see them

Chap. III. Of the other Lawes of Nature.

I. Another of the Lawes of Nature isto performe Contractsor tokeep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law ofNature commands every manas a thing necessaryto obtain Peace; to conveighcertain rights from each to otherand that this (as often as it shall happen tobe done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible topeaceas we shall performe Our selveswhat we contract with othersshall bedoneor omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be madeunlesse we stood to them.Because thereforeto stand to our CovenantsOr to keep faithis a thingnecessary for the obtaining of peaceit will prove by the second Article of thesecond Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.

II. Neither is there in this matterany exception of the personswith whom we Contractas if they keep no faith with others; Or holdthat noneought to be keptor are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he that Contractsin that he doth contractdenies that action to be in vaineand it is againstreason for a knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he think himself notbound to keep itin thinking sohe affirms the Contract to be made in vain: Hethereforewho Contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keepfaithhe doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaineand not invainewhich is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all menorelse not bargain with them; that iseither there must be a declared WarreOr asure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargainas also the taking back of a gift(which ever consists in some actionOr omission) is called an INJURY: But thatactionor omissionis called unjustinsomuch as an injuryand an unjustactionor omissionsignifie the same thingand both are the same with breachof Contract and trust: And it seemes the word Iniury came to be given to anyactionor omissionbecause they were without Right. He that actedor omittedhaving before conveyed bis Right to some other. And there is some likenessebetween thatwhich in the common course of life we call Injury; and thatwhichin the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as hewho by Arguments isdriven to deny the Assertion which he first maintain'dis said to be brought toan absurdity; in like mannerhe who through weaknesse of mind doesor omitsthat which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doeor omitcommits anInjuryand falls into no lesse contradictionthen hewho in the Schools isreduc'd to an Absurdity. For by contracting for some future actionhe wills itdone; by not doing ithe wills it not donewhich is to will a thing doneandnot done at the same timewhich is a contradiction. An Injury therefore is akind of absurdity in conversationas an absurdity is a kind of injury indisputation.

IV. From these grounds it followesthat an injury can be done tono man but him with whom we enter Covenantor to whom somewhat is made over bydeed of giftor to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain. And thereforedamaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his Servantwho hath promis'd to obey himto pay a summe of moneyor carry some present toa third man; the Servantif he doe it nothath indeed damag'd this thirdpartybut he injur'd his Master onely. So also in a civill governmentif anyman offend anotherwith whom he hath made no Contracthe damages him to whomthe evill is donebut he injures none but him to whom the power of governmentbelongs: for if hewho receives the hurtshould expostulate the mischief. andhe that did itshould answer thusWhat art thou to me? Why should I rather doeaccording to yoursthen mine owne willsince I do not hinderbut you may doyour ownand not my mind? In which speechwhere there hath no manner ofpre-contract pastI see notI confessewhat is reprehensible.

Injury can be done against no man

The word injustice relates to some Law: Injury to some Personas well assome Law. For what's unjustis unjust to all; but there may an injury be doneand yet not against menor theebut some other; and sometimes against noprivate Personbut the Magistrate only; sometimes also neither against theMagistratenor any private manbut onely against God; for through Contractand conveighance of Rightwe saythat an injury is done against thisor thatman. Hence it is (which we see in all kind of Government) that what private mencontract between themselves by wordor writingis releast againe at the willof the Obliger. But those mischiefes which are done against the Lawes of theLandas thefthomicideand the likeare punisht not as he willsto whom thehurt is donebut according to the will of the Magistrate; that istheconstituted Lawes.

V. These words justand unjustas also justiceand injusticeare equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Personsanother when to actions: When they are attributed to ActionsJust signifies asmuch as what's done with Rightand unjustas what's done with injury: he whohath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Personbutguiltlesseand he that hath done some unjust thingwe doe not therefore say heis an unjustbut guilty man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to bejustsignifies as much as to be delighted in just dealingto study how to doerighteousnesseor to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and tobe unjustis to neglect righteous dealingor to think it is to be measured notaccording to my contractbut some present benefit; so as the justice orinjustice of the mindthe intentionor the manis one thing; that of anactionor omissionanother; and innumerable actions of a just man may beunjustand of an unjust manjust: But that man is to be accounted justwhodoth just things because the Law commands itunjust things only by reason ofhis infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness forfear of the punishment annext unto the Lawand unrighteousnesse by reason ofthe iniquity of his mind.

VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds;Commutativeand Distributivethe former whereof they say consists inArithmeticallthe latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is conversant inexchangingin buyingsellingborrowinglendinglocationand conductionand other acts whatsoever belonging to Contracterswhereif there be an equallreturn madehence they say springs a commutative justice: But this is busiedabout the dignityand merits of men; so as if there be rendred to every mankata pen axian more to him who is more worthyand lesse to him that deserveslesseand that proportionablyhence they say ariseth distributive justice: Iacknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality; to witthat one is anequality simply so calledas when two things of equall value are compar'dtogetheras a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the otheris an equalitysecundumquod as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to anhundred men600 pounds are given to 60 menand 400 to 40 where there is noequality between 600 and 400. But when it happensthat there is the sameinequality in the number of them to whom it is distributedevery one of themshall take an equall partwhence it is called an equall distribution: But suchlike equality is the same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is allthis to Justice? for neitherif I sell my goods for as much as I can get forthemdoe I injure the buyerwho soughtand desir'd them of me? neither if Idivide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesseso long as I give theother what I have agreed fordo I wrong to either? which truth our Saviourhimselfbeing Godtestifies in the Gospell. This therefore is no distinctionof Justicebut of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'dbut that Justiceis a certain equalityas consisting in this onely; that since we are all equallby natureone should not arrogate more Right to himselfethen he grants toanotherunlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to bespoken against this distinction of Justicealthough now almost generallyreceiv'd by alllest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat elsethen the breach of Faithor Contractas hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old sayingVolenti non fit iniuria (the willing manreceives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. Forgrantthat a man be willing that that should be donewhich he conceives to bean injury. to him; why then that is done by his willwhich by Contract was notlawfull to be done; but he being willing that should be donewhich was notlawfull by Contractthe Contract it self (by the 15. 5 Article of the foregoingChapter) becomes void: The Right therefore of doing it returnestherefore it isdone by Right; wherefore it is no injury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall LawisThat you suffernot him to be the worse for youwho out of the confidence he had in youfirstdid you a good turn; or that you accept not a giftbut with a mind to endeavourthat the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. Forwithout this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where hesees it would be lost; and by this meanes all beneficenceand trusttogetherwith all kind of benevolence would be taken from among menneither would therebe ought of mutuall assistance among themnor any commencement of gaining graceand favour. by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remaincontrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach of this Lawis not a breach of trustor contract(for we suppose no Contracts to havepass'd among them) therefore is it not usually termed an iniurybut becausegood turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each otherit is calledINGRATITUDE.

IX. The fourth precept of NatureisThat every man renderhimself usefull unto others: whichthat we may rightly understandwe mustremember that there is in mena diversity of dispositions to enter intosocietyarising from the diversity of their affectionsnot unlike that whichis found in stonesbrought together in the Buildingby reason of the diversityof their matterand figure. For as a stonewhich in regard of its sharp andangular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfeneither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest togetheroreasily cutand would hinder the building from being fitly compactedis castawayas not fit for use: so a manwho for the harshness of his disposition inretaining superfluities for himselfand detaining of necessaries from othersand being incorrigibleby reason of the stubbornnesse of his affectionsiscommonly said to be uselesseand troublesome unto others. Nowbecause each onenot by Right onelybut even by naturall necessity is suppos'dwith all hismain mightto intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to hisown preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluitiesby his default there will arise a Warrebecause that on him alone there lay nonecessity of contendinghe therefore acts against the fundamentall Law ofNature: Whence it followes (which wee were to shew) that it is a precept ofnature; That every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks thisLaw may be called uselesseand troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity tothis usefulnesseas having regard to this very Law.

X. The fift precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgivehim who repentsand asketh pardon for what is past; having first taken cautionfor the time to come. The pardon of what is pastor the remission of anoffenceis nothing else but the granting of Peace to him that asketh itafterhe hath warr'd against us& now is become penitent. But Peace granted tohim that repents notthat isto him that retains an hostile mindor thatgives not caution for the future; that isseeks not Peacebut oportunityisnot properly Peace but feareand therefore is not commanded by nature. Now tohim that will not pardon the penitentand that gives future cautionpeace itselfe it seems is not pleasing; which is contrary to the naturall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall Law isThat in revenge. andpunishments we must have our eye not at the evill pastbut the future good.That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other endbut that theoffender may be correctedor that others warned by his punishment may becomebetter. But this is confirmed chiefly from hencethat each man is bound by thelaw of nature to forgive one anotherprovided he give caution for the futureas hath been shewed in the foregoing Article. Furthermorebecause revengeifthe time past be onely consideredis nothing else but a certain triumphandglory of mindewhich points at no end(for it contemplates onely what is past;but the end is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is vain;That revenge therefore which regards not the futureproceeds from vaine gloryand therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason introduces awarreand is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature; It is therefore aprecept of the Law of naturethat in revenge wee look not backwards butforward. Now the breach of this Lawis commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatredand contempt provoke mostof all to brawling and fightinginsomuch as most men would rather lose theirlives(that I say not their Peace) then suffer reproach; it followes in theseventh placeThat it is prescribed by the Law of naturethat no man either bydeedsor wordscountenanceor laughterdoe declare himselfe to hateorscorne another. The breach of which Law is called Reproach. But although nothingbe more frequent then the scoffes and jeers of the powerfull against the weakand namely of Judges against guilty personswhich neither relate to the offenceof the guiltynor the duty of the Judgesyet these kind of men do act againstthe Law of natureand are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthybelongsnot to the naturallbut civill state; for it hath been shewed beforeChap. I.Art. 3. that all men by nature are equalland therefore the inequality whichnow issuppose from richespowernobility of kindredis come from the civillLaw. I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as afoundation of the whole politicall sciencethat some men by nature are madeworthy to commandothers onely to serve; as if Lord and Master weredistinguished not by consent of menbut by an aptnessethat isa certain kindof naturall knowledgeor ignorance; which foundation is not onely againstreason (as but now hath been shewed) but also against experience: for neitheralmost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruledby himselfethen to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither if thewiser and stronger doe contesthave these everor often the upper hand ofthose. Whether therefore men be equall by naturethe equality is to beacknowledgedor whether unequallbecause they are like to contest fordominionits necessary for the obtaining of Peacethat they be esteemed asequall; and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of natureThat every man be accounted by nature equall to anotherthe contrary to whichLaw is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conservation of each manthat heshould part with some of his Rightsso it is no lesse necessary to the sameconservationthat he retain some othersto wit the Right of bodily protectionof free enjoyment of ayrewaterand all necessaries for life. Since thereforemany common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable stateandthat many peculiar ones are also acquiredhence ariseth this ninth dictate ofthe naturall Lawto witThat what Rights soever any man challenges tohimselfehe also grant the same as due to all the rest: otherwise he frustratesthe equality acknowledged in the former Article. For what is it else toacknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of societybut to attributeequall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter intosociety? But to ascribe equall things to equallsis the same with giving thingsproportionall to proportionals. The observation of this Law is called MEEKNESthe violation pleonexiathe breakers by the Latines are styled Immodici &immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of natureThatevery man in dividing Right to othersshew himselfe equall to either party. Bythe foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selvesthen we grant to others. We may take lesse if we willfor that sometimes is anargument of modesty. But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by usunto otherswe are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse thenanother. For he that by favouring one before anotherobserves not this naturallequalityreproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared abovethat a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Preceptis called EQUITY; the breachRespect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term itprosopolepsia.

XVI. From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventhThosethings which cannot be dividedmust be used in common(if they can) and (thatthe quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he listsbut if thequantity permit notthen with limitationand proPortionally to the number ofthe users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be observedwhich wehave shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot be dividednor had in commonit isprovided by the Law of nature (which may be the twelfth Precept) that the use ofthat thing be either by turnsor adjudged to one onely by lotand that in theusing it by turnsit be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it;For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be foundbutthat of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbitraryor naturall; Arbitraryis that which is cast by the consent of the Contendersand it consists in meerchance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek klironomiaas it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the things which canneither be dividednor had in commonmust be granted to the first possessouras also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonneunlessethe Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other. Letthis therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is; That safety must beassured to the mediators for Peace. For the reason which commands the endcommands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of Reason isPeace. All the rest are means to obtain itand without which Peace cannot behad. But neither can Peace be had without mediationnor mediation withoutsafety; it is therefore a dictate of Reasonthat isa Law of natureThat wemust give all security to the Mediators for Peace.

XX. Furthermorebecausealthough men should agree to make alltheseand whatsoever other Lawes of Natureand should endeavour to keep themyet doubtsand controversies would daily arise concerning the application ofthem unto their actionsto witwhether what was donewere against the Lawornot(which we callthe question of Right) whence will follow a fight betweenPartieseither sides supposing themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary tothe preservation of Peace (because in this case no other fit remedy can possiblybe thought on) that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto somethirdand oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement indeciding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is calledan Arbiter. It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall LawThat bothparties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto theopinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this groundthat an Arbiter or Judge is chosen bythe differing Parties to determine the controversiewe gatherthat the Arbitermust not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to seek what is goodfor himselfe naturallyand what is justonely for Peaces sakeandaccidentally. and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded bytheLaw of nature so exactly as a third man would do: It is therefore in thesixteenth place contained in the Law of natureThat no man must be Judge orArbiter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground followes in the seventeenth placeThatno man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profitor gloryfrom the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes hereas in theforegoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfeto witwhether that bee done or notwhich is said to bee donethe naturallLaw willsthat the Arbiter trust both Parties alikethat is(because theyaffirm contradictories) that hee believe neither: He must therefore give creditto a thirdor a third and fourthor morethat he may be able to givejudgement of the factas often as by other signes he cannot come to theknowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbitersand Iudgesof factThat where firm and certain signes of the fact appear notthere theyrule their sentence by such witnessesas seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may befurthermore understoodThat no contract or promise must Passe between him andthe parties whose Iudge he is appointedby vertue whereof he may be engaged tospeak in favour of either partnayor be oblig'd to judge according to equityor to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall. The Judge isindeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law ofNature re-counted in the 15. Article. To the obligation of which Law nothing canbe added by way of Compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besidesifgiving wrong judgementhe should contend for the equity of itexcept suchCompact be of no forcethe Controversie would remain after Judgement givenwhich is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiterwho is so chosenas bothparties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he shouldpronounce. The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge to be dis-engagedwhich is its 19 precept.

XXV. Farthermoreforasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought elsebut the dictates of Reasonso asunlesse a man endeavour to preserve thefaculty of right reasoninghe cannot observe the Lawes of Natureit ismanifestthat hewho knowinglyor willinglydoth oughtwhereby therationall faculty may be destroyedor weaknedhe knowinglyand willinglybreaks the Law of nature: For there is no difference between a man who performesnot his Dutyand him who does such things willinglyas make it impossible forhim to doe it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning facultywho doe thatwhich disturbs the mind from its naturall state; that which most manifestlyhappens to Drunkards and Gluttons; we therefore sin in the 20 place against theLaw of Nature by Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some manwho sees all these precepts of Naturederiv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us tolook to the preservationand safegard of our selveswill sayThat thededuction of these Lawes is so hardthat it is not to be expected they will bevulgarly knownand therefore neither will they prove obliging: for Lawesifthey be not knownoblige notnayindeed are not Lawes. To this I answerit'strueThat hopefearangerambitioncovetousnessevain gloryand otherperturbations of minddoe hinder a man soas he cannot attaine to theknowledge of these Laweswhilst those passions prevail in him: But there is noman who is not sometimes in a quiet mind; At that time therefore there isnothing easier for him to knowthough he be never so rude and unlearn'dthenthis only RuleThat when he doubtswhether what he is now doing to anothermay be done by the Law of Natureor nothe conceive himselfe to be in thatothers stead. Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to thefactbeing now cast into the other scaledisswade him as much: And this Ruleis not onely easiebut is Anciently celebrated in these wordsQuod tibi fierinon visalteri ne feceris: Do not that to othersyou would not have done toyour self.

XXVII. But because most menby reason of their perverse desire ofpresent profitare very unapt to observe these Lawesalthough acknowledg'd bythemif perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise thatequity and usefulnesse which Reason dictatesthose not practising the samesurely they would not follow Reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procurethemselves peacebut a more certain quick destructionand the keepers of theLaw become a meer prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to beimagin'dthat by Nature(that isby Reason) men are oblig'd to the exerciseof all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd byothers. We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observethem whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for whichthey were ordain'd. We must therefore concludethat the Law of Nature dothalwayesand every where oblige in the internall Courtor that of Consciencebut not alwayes in the externall Courtbut then onely when it may be done withsafety.

The exercise of all these Lawes

Nay among these Lawes some things there arethe omission whereof (providedit be done for Peaceor Self-preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfillingthen breach of the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those thatdoe all thingsand plunders plunderersdoth equity; but on the other sidetodoe that which in Peace is an handsome actionand becomming an honest manisdejectednesseand Poornesse of spiritand a betraying of ones self in the timeof WarBut there are certain naturall Laweswhose exercise ceaseth not even inthe time of War it self; for I cannot understand what drunkennesseor cruelty(that isRevenge which respects not the future good) can advance toward Peaceor the preservation of any man. Brieflyin the state of naturewhat's justand unjustis not to be esteem'd by the Actionsbut by the CounsellandConscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessityout of endeavourfor Peacefor the preservation of our selvesis done with Right; otherwiseevery damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Lawand an injuryagainst God.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige Consciencemay be broken by anactnot onely contrary to thembut also agreeable with themif so be that hewho does it be of another opinion: for though the act it self be answerable tothe Lawesyet his Conscience is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immutableand eternall; What theyforbidcan never be lawfull; what they commandcan never be unlawfull: Forprideingratitudebreach of Contracts (or injury)inhumanitycontumelywillnever be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfullas we takethem for dispositions of the mindthat isas they are considered in the Courtof Consciencewhere onely they obligeand are Lawes. Yet actions may be sodiversified by circumstancesand the Civill Lawthat what's done with equityat one timeis guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at onetimeis contrary to it another. Yet Reason is still the sameand changeth nother endwhich is Peaceand Defence; nor of the minde which the meanes toattaine themto witthose vertues we have declar'd aboveand which cannot beabrogated by any Customeor Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hitherto been saidhow easily theLawes of Nature are to be observ'dbecause they require the endeavour onely(but that must be true and constant) which who so shall performewe may rightlycall him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole mightnamelythat hisactions be squar'd according to the precepts of Naturehe shewes clearly thathe hath a minde to fulfill all those Laweswhich is all we are oblig'd to byrationall nature. Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd tois a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same withthe Morall. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know thereforethat Goodand Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclinationor aversion ofthem by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverseaccordingto their diverse ConstitutionsCustomesOpinions; as we may see in thosethings we apprehend by senseas by tastingtouchingsmelling; but much morein those which pertain to the common actions of lifewhere what this mancommends(that is to saycalls Good) the other undervaluesas being Evil;Nayvery often the same man at diverse timespraisesand dispraises the samething. Whilst thus they doenecessary it is there should be discordandstrife: They are therefore so long in the state of Waras by reason of thediversity of the present appetitesthey mete Good and Evill by diversemeasures. All men easily acknowledge this stateas long as they are in ittobe evilland by consequence that Peace is good. They therefore who could notagree concerning a presentdoe agree concerning a future Goodwhich indeed isa work of Reason; for things present are obvious to the sensethings to come toour Reason only. Reason declaring Peace to be goodit followes by the samereasonthat all the necessary means to Peace be good alsoand thereforethatModestyEquityTrustHumanityMercy (which we have demonstrated to benecessary to Peace) are good Mannersor habits(that is) Vertues. The Lawthereforein the means to Peacecommands also Good Mannersor the practise ofVertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off this same irrationallappetitewhereby they greedily prefer the present good (to whichby strictconsequencemany unfore-seen evills doe adhere) before the futureit happensthat though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertuesyetthey disagree still concerning their Natureto witin what each of them dothconsist; for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any manthat actionhath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actionswhichplease themare ever entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe thatthe same Action is prais'd by theseand call'd Vertueand dispraised by thoseand termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers forthis matter; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions toconsist in thisthat it was in order to Peaceand the evill in thisthat itrelated to discordthey built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from themorall Lawand unconstant to it self; for they would have the nature of vertuesseated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremesand the vices inthe extremes themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is commendedand under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertuealthough it be anextremeif the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing givenwhetherit be greator littleor between bothmakes not liberalitybut the cause ofgiving it. Neither is it injusticeif I give any man moreof what is mine ownthen I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of MorallPhilosophywhereof I have onely delivered such precepts in this placeasappertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arisefrom discord. But there are other precepts of rationall naturefrom whencespring other vertues: for temperance also is a precept of Reasonbecauseintemperance tends to sicknesseand death. And so fortitude too(that is) thatsame faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers(and which are more hardlydeclined then overcome) because it is a means tending to the preservation of himthat resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the Lawes of nature (since theyare nothing else but certain conclusions understood by Reasonof things to bedoneand omitted; but a Law to speak properly and accuratelyis the speech ofhim who by Right commands somewhat to others to be doneor omitted) are not (inpropriety of speech) Lawesas they proceed from nature; yet as they aredelivered by God in holy Scriptures(as we shall see in the Chapter following)they are most properly called by the name of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture isthe speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right.

Chap. III. Of the other Lawes of Nature.

I. Another of the Lawes of Nature isto performe Contractsor tokeep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law ofNature commands every manas a thing necessaryto obtain Peace; to conveighcertain rights from each to otherand that this (as often as it shall happen tobe done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible topeaceas we shall performe Our selveswhat we contract with othersshall bedoneor omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be madeunlesse we stood tothem. Because thereforeto stand to our CovenantsOr to keep faithis a thingnecessary for the obtaining of peaceit will prove by the second Article of thesecond Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.

II. Neither is there in this matterany exception of the personswith whom we Contractas if they keep no faith with others; Or holdthat noneought to be keptor are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he thatContractsin that he doth contractdenies that action to be in vaineand itis against reason for a knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he thinkhimself not bound to keep itin thinking sohe affirms the Contract to be madein vain: He thereforewho Contracts with one with whom he thinks he is notbound to keep faithhe doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done invaineand not in vainewhich is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trustwith all menor else not bargain with them; that iseither there must be adeclared WarreOr a sure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargainas also the taking back of a gift(which ever consists in some actionOr omission) is called an INJURY: But thatactionor omissionis called unjustinsomuch as an injuryand an unjustactionor omissionsignifie the same thingand both are the same with breachof Contract and trust: And it seemes the word Iniury came to be given to anyactionor omissionbecause they were without Right. He that actedor omittedhaving before conveyed bis Right to some other. And there is some likenessebetween thatwhich in the common course of life we call Injury; and thatwhichin the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as hewho by Arguments isdriven to deny the Assertion which he first maintain'dis said to be brought toan absurdity; in like mannerhe who through weaknesse of mind doesor omitsthat which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doeor omitcommits anInjuryand falls into no lesse contradictionthen hewho in the Schools isreduc'd to an Absurdity. For by contracting for some future actionhe wills itdone; by not doing ithe wills it not donewhich is to will a thing doneandnot done at the same timewhich is a contradiction. An Injury therefore is akind of absurdity in conversationas an absurdity is a kind of injury indisputation.

IV. From these grounds it followesthat an injury can be done tono man but him with whom we enter Covenantor to whom somewhat is made over bydeed of giftor to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain. And thereforedamaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his Servantwho hath promis'd to obey himto pay a summe of moneyor carry some present toa third man; the Servantif he doe it nothath indeed damag'd this thirdpartybut he injur'd his Master onely. So also in a civill governmentif anyman offend anotherwith whom he hath made no Contracthe damages him to whomthe evill is donebut he injures none but him to whom the power of governmentbelongs: for if hewho receives the hurtshould expostulate the mischief. andhe that did itshould answer thusWhat art thou to me? Why should I rather doeaccording to yoursthen mine owne willsince I do not hinderbut you may doyour ownand not my mind? In which speechwhere there hath no manner ofpre-contract pastI see notI confessewhat is reprehensible.

Injury can be done against no man

The word injustice relates to some Law: Injury to some Personas well assome Law. For what's unjustis unjust to all; but there may an injury be doneand yet not against menor theebut some other; and sometimes against noprivate Personbut the Magistrate only; sometimes also neither against theMagistratenor any private manbut onely against God; for through Contractand conveighance of Rightwe saythat an injury is done against thisor thatman. Hence it is (which we see in all kind of Government) that what private mencontract between themselves by wordor writingis releast againe at the willof the Obliger. But those mischiefes which are done against the Lawes of theLandas thefthomicideand the likeare punisht not as he willsto whom thehurt is donebut according to the will of the Magistrate; that istheconstituted Lawes.

V. These words justand unjustas also justiceand injusticeare equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Personsanother when to actions: When they are attributed to ActionsJust signifies asmuch as what's done with Rightand unjustas what's done with injury: he whohath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Personbutguiltlesseand he that hath done some unjust thingwe doe not therefore say heis an unjustbut guilty man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to bejustsignifies as much as to be delighted in just dealingto study how to doerighteousnesseor to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and tobe unjustis to neglect righteous dealingor to think it is to be measured notaccording to my contractbut some present benefit; so as the justice orinjustice of the mindthe intentionor the manis one thing; that of anactionor omissionanother; and innumerable actions of a just man may beunjustand of an unjust manjust: But that man is to be accounted justwhodoth just things because the Law commands itunjust things only by reason ofhis infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness forfear of the punishment annext unto the Lawand unrighteousnesse by reason ofthe iniquity of his mind.

VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into twokinds; Commutativeand Distributivethe former whereof they say consists inArithmeticallthe latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is conversant inexchangingin buyingsellingborrowinglendinglocationand conductionand other acts whatsoever belonging to Contracterswhereif there be an equallreturn madehence they say springs a commutative justice: But this is busiedabout the dignityand merits of men; so as if there be rendred to every mankata pen axian more to him who is more worthyand lesse to him that deserveslesseand that proportionablyhence they say ariseth distributive justice: Iacknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality; to witthat one is anequality simply so calledas when two things of equall value are compar'dtogetheras a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the otheris an equalitysecundumquod as when a 1000 pound is to be divided to anhundred men600 pounds are given to 60 menand 400 to 40 where there is noequality between 600 and 400. But when it happensthat there is the sameinequality in the number of them to whom it is distributedevery one of themshall take an equall partwhence it is called an equall distribution: But suchlike equality is the same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is allthis to Justice? for neitherif I sell my goods for as much as I can get forthemdoe I injure the buyerwho soughtand desir'd them of me? neither if Idivide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesseso long as I give theother what I have agreed fordo I wrong to either? which truth our Saviourhimselfbeing Godtestifies in the Gospell. This therefore is no distinctionof Justicebut of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'dbut that Justiceis a certain equalityas consisting in this onely; that since we are all equallby natureone should not arrogate more Right to himselfethen he grants toanotherunlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to bespoken against this distinction of Justicealthough now almost generallyreceiv'd by alllest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat elsethen the breach of Faithor Contractas hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old sayingVolenti non fit iniuria (the willing manreceives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. Forgrantthat a man be willing that that should be donewhich he conceives to bean injury. to him; why then that is done by his willwhich by Contract was notlawfull to be done; but he being willing that should be donewhich was notlawfull by Contractthe Contract it self (by the 15. 5 Article of the foregoingChapter) becomes void: The Right therefore of doing it returnestherefore it isdone by Right; wherefore it is no injury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall LawisThat you suffernot him to be the worse for youwho out of the confidence he had in youfirstdid you a good turn; or that you accept not a giftbut with a mind toendeavourthat the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift.For without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefitwhere he sees it would be lost; and by this meanes all beneficenceand trusttogether with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among menneitherwould there be ought of mutuall assistance among themnor any commencement ofgaining grace and favour. by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarilyremaincontrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach ofthis Law is not a breach of trustor contract(for we suppose no Contracts tohave pass'd among them) therefore is it not usually termed an iniurybutbecause good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each otherit is calledINGRATITUDE.

IX. The fourth precept of NatureisThat every man renderhimself usefull unto others: whichthat we may rightly understandwe mustremember that there is in mena diversity of dispositions to enter intosocietyarising from the diversity of their affectionsnot unlike that whichis found in stonesbrought together in the Buildingby reason of the diversityof their matterand figure. For as a stonewhich in regard of its sharp andangular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfeneither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest togetheroreasily cutand would hinder the building from being fitly compactedis castawayas not fit for use: so a manwho for the harshness of his disposition inretaining superfluities for himselfand detaining of necessaries from othersand being incorrigibleby reason of the stubbornnesse of his affectionsiscommonly said to be uselesseand troublesome unto others. Nowbecause each onenot by Right onelybut even by naturall necessity is suppos'dwith all hismain mightto intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to hisown preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluitiesby his default there will arise a Warrebecause that on him alone there lay nonecessity of contendinghe therefore acts against the fundamentall Law ofNature: Whence it followes (which wee were to shew) that it is a precept ofnature; That every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks thisLaw may be called uselesseand troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity tothis usefulnesseas having regard to this very Law.

X. The fift precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgivehim who repentsand asketh pardon for what is past; having first taken cautionfor the time to come. The pardon of what is pastor the remission of anoffenceis nothing else but the granting of Peace to him that asketh itafterhe hath warr'd against us& now is become penitent. But Peace granted tohim that repents notthat isto him that retains an hostile mindor thatgives not caution for the future; that isseeks not Peacebut oportunityisnot properly Peace but feareand therefore is not commanded by nature. Now tohim that will not pardon the penitentand that gives future cautionpeace itselfe it seems is not pleasing; which is contrary to the naturall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall Law isThat in revenge. andpunishments we must have our eye not at the evill pastbut the future good.That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other endbut that theoffender may be correctedor that others warned by his punishment may becomebetter. But this is confirmed chiefly from hencethat each man is bound by thelaw of nature to forgive one anotherprovided he give caution for the futureas hath been shewed in the foregoing Article. Furthermorebecause revengeifthe time past be onely consideredis nothing else but a certain triumphandglory of mindewhich points at no end(for it contemplates onely what is past;but the end is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is vain;That revenge therefore which regards not the futureproceeds from vaine gloryand therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason introduces awarreand is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature; It is therefore aprecept of the Law of naturethat in revenge wee look not backwards butforward. Now the breach of this Lawis commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatredand contempt provoke mostof all to brawling and fightinginsomuch as most men would rather lose theirlives(that I say not their Peace) then suffer reproach; it followes in theseventh placeThat it is prescribed by the Law of naturethat no man either bydeedsor wordscountenanceor laughterdoe declare himselfe to hateorscorne another. The breach of which Law is called Reproach. But although nothingbe more frequent then the scoffes and jeers of the powerfull against the weakand namely of Judges against guilty personswhich neither relate to the offenceof the guiltynor the duty of the Judgesyet these kind of men do act againstthe Law of natureand are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthybelongsnot to the naturallbut civill state; for it hath been shewed beforeChap. I.Art. 3. that all men by nature are equalland therefore the inequality whichnow issuppose from richespowernobility of kindredis come from the civillLaw. I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as afoundation of the whole politicall sciencethat some men by nature are madeworthy to commandothers onely to serve; as if Lord and Master weredistinguished not by consent of menbut by an aptnessethat isa certain kindof naturall knowledgeor ignorance; which foundation is not onely againstreason (as but now hath been shewed) but also against experience: for neitheralmost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruledby himselfethen to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither if thewiser and stronger doe contesthave these everor often the upper hand ofthose. Whether therefore men be equall by naturethe equality is to beacknowledgedor whether unequallbecause they are like to contest fordominionits necessary for the obtaining of Peacethat they be esteemed asequall; and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of natureThat every man be accounted by nature equall to anotherthe contrary to whichLaw is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conservation of each manthat heshould part with some of his Rightsso it is no lesse necessary to the sameconservationthat he retain some othersto wit the Right of bodily protectionof free enjoyment of ayrewaterand all necessaries for life. Since thereforemany common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable stateandthat many peculiar ones are also acquiredhence ariseth this ninth dictate ofthe naturall Lawto witThat what Rights soever any man challenges tohimselfehe also grant the same as due to all the rest: otherwise he frustratesthe equality acknowledged in the former Article. For what is it else toacknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of societybut to attributeequall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter intosociety? But to ascribe equall things to equallsis the same with giving thingsproportionall to proportionals. The observation of this Law is called MEEKNESthe violation pleonexiathe breakers by the Latines are styled Immodici &immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of natureThatevery man in dividing Right to othersshew himselfe equall to either party. Bythe foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selvesthen we grant to others. We may take lesse if we willfor that sometimes is anargument of modesty. But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by usunto otherswe are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse thenanother. For he that by favouring one before anotherobserves not this naturallequalityreproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared abovethat a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Preceptis called EQUITY; the breachRespect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term itprosopolepsia.

XVI. From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventhThosethings which cannot be dividedmust be used in common(if they can) and (thatthe quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he listsbut if thequantity permit notthen with limitationand proPortionally to the number ofthe users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be observedwhich wehave shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot be dividednor had in commonit isprovided by the Law of nature (which may be the twelfth Precept) that the use ofthat thing be either by turnsor adjudged to one onely by lotand that in theusing it by turnsit be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it;For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be foundbutthat of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbitraryor naturall; Arbitraryis that which is cast by the consent of the Contendersand it consists in meerchance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek klironomiaas it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the things which canneither be dividednor had in commonmust be granted to the first possessouras also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonneunlessethe Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other. Letthis therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is; That safety must beassured to the mediators for Peace. For the reason which commands the endcommands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of Reason isPeace. All the rest are means to obtain itand without which Peace cannot behad. But neither can Peace be had without mediationnor mediation withoutsafety; it is therefore a dictate of Reasonthat isa Law of natureThat wemust give all security to the Mediators for Peace.

XX. Furthermorebecausealthough men should agree to make alltheseand whatsoever other Lawes of Natureand should endeavour to keep themyet doubtsand controversies would daily arise concerning the application ofthem unto their actionsto witwhether what was donewere against the Lawornot(which we callthe question of Right) whence will follow a fight betweenPartieseither sides supposing themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary tothe preservation of Peace (because in this case no other fit remedy can possiblybe thought on) that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto somethirdand oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement indeciding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is calledan Arbiter. It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall LawThat bothparties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto theopinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this groundthat an Arbiter or Judge is chosen bythe differing Parties to determine the controversiewe gatherthat the Arbitermust not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to seek what is goodfor himselfe naturallyand what is justonely for Peaces sakeandaccidentally. and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded bytheLaw of nature so exactly as a third man would do: It is therefore in thesixteenth place contained in the Law of natureThat no man must be Judge orArbiter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground followes in the seventeenth placeThatno man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profitor gloryfrom the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes hereas in theforegoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfeto witwhether that bee done or notwhich is said to bee donethe naturallLaw willsthat the Arbiter trust both Parties alikethat is(because theyaffirm contradictories) that hee believe neither: He must therefore give creditto a thirdor a third and fourthor morethat he may be able to givejudgement of the factas often as by other signes he cannot come to theknowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbitersand Iudgesof factThat where firm and certain signes of the fact appear notthere theyrule their sentence by such witnessesas seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may befurthermore understoodThat no contract or promise must Passe between him andthe parties whose Iudge he is appointedby vertue whereof he may be engaged tospeak in favour of either partnayor be oblig'd to judge according to equityor to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall. The Judge isindeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law ofNature re-counted in the 15. Article. To the obligation of which Law nothing canbe added by way of Compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besidesifgiving wrong judgementhe should contend for the equity of itexcept suchCompact be of no forcethe Controversie would remain after Judgement givenwhich is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiterwho is so chosenas bothparties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he shouldpronounce. The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge to be dis-engagedwhich is its 19 precept.

XXV. Farthermoreforasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought elsebut the dictates of Reasonso asunlesse a man endeavour to preserve thefaculty of right reasoninghe cannot observe the Lawes of Natureit ismanifestthat hewho knowinglyor willinglydoth oughtwhereby therationall faculty may be destroyedor weaknedhe knowinglyand willinglybreaks the Law of nature: For there is no difference between a man who performesnot his Dutyand him who does such things willinglyas make it impossible forhim to doe it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning facultywho doe thatwhich disturbs the mind from its naturall state; that which most manifestlyhappens to Drunkards and Gluttons; we therefore sin in the 20 place against theLaw of Nature by Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some manwho sees all these precepts of Naturederiv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us tolook to the preservationand safegard of our selveswill sayThat thededuction of these Lawes is so hardthat it is not to be expected they will bevulgarly knownand therefore neither will they prove obliging: for Lawesifthey be not knownoblige notnayindeed are not Lawes. To this I answerit'strueThat hopefearangerambitioncovetousnessevain gloryand otherperturbations of minddoe hinder a man soas he cannot attaine to theknowledge of these Laweswhilst those passions prevail in him: But there is noman who is not sometimes in a quiet mind; At that time therefore there isnothing easier for him to knowthough he be never so rude and unlearn'dthenthis only RuleThat when he doubtswhether what he is now doing to anothermay be done by the Law of Natureor nothe conceive himselfe to be in thatothers stead. Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to thefactbeing now cast into the other scaledisswade him as much: And this Ruleis not onely easiebut is Anciently celebrated in these wordsQuod tibi fierinon visalteri ne feceris: Do not that to othersyou would not have done toyour self.

XXVII. But because most menby reason of their perverse desire ofpresent profitare very unapt to observe these Lawesalthough acknowledg'd bythemif perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise thatequity and usefulnesse which Reason dictatesthose not practising the samesurely they would not follow Reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procurethemselves peacebut a more certain quick destructionand the keepers of theLaw become a meer prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to beimagin'dthat by Nature(that isby Reason) men are oblig'd to the exerciseof all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd byothers. We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observethem whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for whichthey were ordain'd. We must therefore concludethat the Law of Nature dothalwayesand every where oblige in the internall Courtor that of Consciencebut not alwayes in the externall Courtbut then onely when it may be done withsafety.

The exercise of all these Lawes

Nay among these Lawes some things there arethe omission whereof (providedit be done for Peaceor Self-preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfillingthen breach of the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those thatdoe all thingsand plunders plunderersdoth equity; but on the other sidetodoe that which in Peace is an handsome actionand becomming an honest manisdejectednesseand Poornesse of spiritand a betraying of ones self in the timeof WarBut there are certain naturall Laweswhose exercise ceaseth not even inthe time of War it self; for I cannot understand what drunkennesseor cruelty(that isRevenge which respects not the future good) can advance toward Peaceor the preservation of any man. Brieflyin the state of naturewhat's justand unjustis not to be esteem'd by the Actionsbut by the CounsellandConscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessityout of endeavourfor Peacefor the preservation of our selvesis done with Right; otherwiseevery damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Lawand an injuryagainst God.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige Consciencemay be broken by anactnot onely contrary to thembut also agreeable with themif so be that hewho does it be of another opinion: for though the act it self be answerable tothe Lawesyet his Conscience is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immutableand eternall; What theyforbidcan never be lawfull; what they commandcan never be unlawfull: Forprideingratitudebreach of Contracts (or injury)inhumanitycontumelywillnever be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfullas we takethem for dispositions of the mindthat isas they are considered in the Courtof Consciencewhere onely they obligeand are Lawes. Yet actions may be sodiversified by circumstancesand the Civill Lawthat what's done with equityat one timeis guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at onetimeis contrary to it another. Yet Reason is still the sameand changeth nother endwhich is Peaceand Defence; nor of the minde which the meanes toattaine themto witthose vertues we have declar'd aboveand which cannot beabrogated by any Customeor Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hitherto been saidhow easily theLawes of Nature are to be observ'dbecause they require the endeavour onely(but that must be true and constant) which who so shall performewe may rightlycall him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole mightnamelythat hisactions be squar'd according to the precepts of Naturehe shewes clearly thathe hath a minde to fulfill all those Laweswhich is all we are oblig'd to byrationall nature. Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd tois a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same withthe Morall. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know thereforethat Goodand Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclinationor aversion ofthem by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverseaccordingto their diverse ConstitutionsCustomesOpinions; as we may see in thosethings we apprehend by senseas by tastingtouchingsmelling; but much morein those which pertain to the common actions of lifewhere what this mancommends(that is to saycalls Good) the other undervaluesas being Evil;Nayvery often the same man at diverse timespraisesand dispraises the samething. Whilst thus they doenecessary it is there should be discordandstrife: They are therefore so long in the state of Waras by reason of thediversity of the present appetitesthey mete Good and Evill by diversemeasures. All men easily acknowledge this stateas long as they are in ittobe evilland by consequence that Peace is good. They therefore who could notagree concerning a presentdoe agree concerning a future Goodwhich indeed isa work of Reason; for things present are obvious to the sensethings to come toour Reason only. Reason declaring Peace to be goodit followes by the samereasonthat all the necessary means to Peace be good alsoand thereforethatModestyEquityTrustHumanityMercy (which we have demonstrated to benecessary to Peace) are good Mannersor habits(that is) Vertues. The Lawthereforein the means to Peacecommands also Good Mannersor the practise ofVertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off this same irrationallappetitewhereby they greedily prefer the present good (to whichby strictconsequencemany unfore-seen evills doe adhere) before the futureit happensthat though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertuesyetthey disagree still concerning their Natureto witin what each of them dothconsist; for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any manthat actionhath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actionswhichplease themare ever entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe thatthe same Action is prais'd by theseand call'd Vertueand dispraised by thoseand termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers forthis matter; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions toconsist in thisthat it was in order to Peaceand the evill in thisthat itrelated to discordthey built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from themorall Lawand unconstant to it self; for they would have the nature of vertuesseated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremesand the vices inthe extremes themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is commendedand under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertuealthough it be anextremeif the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing givenwhetherit be greator littleor between bothmakes not liberalitybut the cause ofgiving it. Neither is it injusticeif I give any man moreof what is mine ownthen I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of MorallPhilosophywhereof I have onely delivered such precepts in this placeasappertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arisefrom discord. But there are other precepts of rationall naturefrom whencespring other vertues: for temperance also is a precept of Reasonbecauseintemperance tends to sicknesseand death. And so fortitude too(that is) thatsame faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers(and which are more hardlydeclined then overcome) because it is a means tending to the preservation of himthat resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the Lawes of nature (since theyare nothing else but certain conclusions understood by Reasonof things to bedoneand omitted; but a Law to speak properly and accuratelyis the speech ofhim who by Right commands somewhat to others to be doneor omitted) are not (inpropriety of speech) Lawesas they proceed from nature; yet as they aredelivered by God in holy Scriptures(as we shall see in the Chapter following)they are most properly called by the name of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture isthe speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right.

Chapter IV That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law

I. The same Law which is Naturalland Morallis also wont to becalled Divinenor undeservedlyas well because Reasonwhich is the law ofNatureis given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because theprecepts of living which are thence derivedare the same with those which havebeen delivered from the divine Majestyfor the LAWES of his heavenly Kingdomeby our Lord Iesus Christand his holy Prophets and Apostles. What therefore byreasoning we have understood above concerning the law of naturewe willendeavour to confirme the same in this Chapter by holy writ.

II. But first we will shew those places in which it is declaredthat the Divine Law is seated in right reason. Psalm 373031. The mouth ofthe righteous will be exercised in wisdomeand his tongue will be talking ofIudgement: The law of God is in his heart. Jerem. 31. 33. I will put my law intheir inward partsand write it in their hearts. Psal. 19. 7. The law of theLord is an undefiled lawconverting the soule. ver. 8. The Commandement of theLord is Pureand giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron. 30. 11. ThisCommandement which I command thee this dayit is not hidden from theeneitheris it far off&c. vers. 14. But the word is very nigh unto theein thymouthand in thine heart; that thou maist doe it. Psal. 119. 34. Give meunderstandingand I shall keep thy law. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto myfeetand a light unto my paths. Proverbs 9. 10. The knowledge of the holy isunderstanding. John 1. 1. Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called the word.vers. 9. The same Christ is called the true light that ligiteth every man thatcometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right reasonwhose dictateswe have shewed beforeare the lawes of nature.

III. But that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law ofnaturenamelythat Peace was to be sought foris also the summe of the divinelawwill be manifest by these places. Rom. 3. 17. Righteousnesse(which is thesumme of the law) is called the way of Peace Psal. 85. 10. Righteousnesse andPeace have kissed each other. Matth. 5. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makersforthey shall be called the children of God. And after Saint Paul in his 6. Chapterto the Hebrewesand the last verse had called Christ (the Legislator of thatlaw we treat of) an High-Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedeck; headdes in the following Chapterthe first verseThis Melchizedeck was King ofSalemPriest of the most high God&c. vers. 2. First being byinterpretation King of Righteousnesseand after that also King of SalemwhichisKing of peace. Whence it is clearethat Christ the King in his Kingdomeplaceth Righteousnesse and Peace together. Psal. 34. Eschue evill and doe goodseek Peace and ensue it. Isaiah 9. 67. Unto us a child is bornunto us aSonne is givenand the government shall be upon his shoulderand his nameshall be called WonderfullCounsellourthe mighty Godthe everlasting Fatherthe Prince of peace. Isaiah 52. 7. How beautifull upon the mountaines are thefeet of him that bringeth good tidingsthat publisheth Peacethat bringethgood tidings of goodthat publisheth salvationthat saith unto Sionthy Godreigneth! 3 Luke 2. 14. In the Nativity of Christthe voice of them thatpraised God sayingGlory be to God on highand in earth Peacegood willtowards men. And Isaiah 53. 5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of ourPeace. Isay 59. 8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace. The way of Peacethey know notand there is no judgement in their goings. Micah 5. 45.speaking of the Messiashe saith thushee shall stand and feed in the strengthof the Lordin the Majesty of the name of the Lord his Godand they shallabidefor now shall he be great unto the end of the earth; And this man shallbe your Peace&c. Prov. 3. 12. My sonne forget not my lawbut let thineheart keep my Commandementsfor length of dayesand long lifeand Peaceshall they adde to thee.

IV. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the communityof all thingsor concerning the introduction of meum & tuumWe perceive inthe first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peaceby thosewords of Abraham to LotGen. 13. 8. Let there be no strife I Pray theebetweenthee and meand between thy heard-menand my heard-menfor we be brethren. Isnot the whole land before thee? Separate thy selfe I Pray thee from me. And allthose places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon ourneighboursasThou shalt not killthou shalt not commit adulterythou shaltnot steal&c. doe confirm the law of distinction between Mineand Thine.for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

V. The same precepts establish the second law of nature of keepingtrust: for what dothThou shalt not invade anothers rightimportbut this?Thou shalt not take possession of thatwhich by thy contract ceaseth to bethine; but expressely set downPsal. 15. vers. 1. To him that askedLord whoshall dwell in thy Tabernacle? It is answeredvers. 34: He that sweareth untohis neighbourand disappointeth him not; and Prov. 6. 1. My sonne if thou besurety for thy friendif thou have stricken thy hand with a strangerThou artsnared with the words of thy mouth.

VI. The third Law concerning gratitude is proved by these placesDeut. 25. 4. Thou shalt not muzzle the Oxe when he treadeth out the corn; whichSaint Paul I. Cor. 9. 9. interprets to be spoken of mennot Oxen onely. Prov.17. 13. Who so rewardeth evill for goodevill shall not depart from his house.And Deut. 20. 1011. When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against itthen proclaim Peace unto it. And it shall be if it make thee answer of Peaceand oPen unto theethen it shall be that all the people that is found thereinshall be tributaries unto theeand they shall serve thee. Proverbs 3. 29.Devise not evill against thy neighbourseeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

VII. To the fourth Law of accommodating our selvesthese preceptsare conformableExod. 23. 45. If thou meet thine enemies Oxeor his Assegoing astraythou shalt surely bring it back to him again; if thou see the Asseof him that hateth thee lying under his burdenand wouldest forbear to helphimthou shalt surely help with himvers. 9. Alsothou shalt not oppresse astranger. Prov. 3. 30. Strive not with a man without a causeif he have donethee no harme. Prov. 15. 18. A wrathfull man stirreth up strifebut he that isslow to angerappeaseth strife. 18. 24. There is a friend that sticketh closerthen a brother. The same is confirmedLuke 10. By the Parable of the Samaritanwho had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theevesand by ChristspreceptMatth. 5. 39. But I say unto youthat ye resist not evillbutwhosoever shall smite thee on the right cheekturn to him the other also&c.

VIII. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth lawtheseare some. Matth. 6. 14. If you forgive men their trespassesyour heavenlyFather will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their trespassesneither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Math. 18. 21. Lord how oftshall my Brother sinne against meand I forgive him? till seven times? Jesussaith unto himI say not till seven timesbut till seventy times seven times:that istoties quoties.

IX. For the confirmation of the sixth lawall those places arepertinent which command us to shew mercy; such as Mat. 5. 7. Blessed are themercifullfor they shall obtain mercy. Levit. 19. 18. Thou shalt not avengenor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But there arewho notonely think this law is not proved by Scripturebut plainly disproved fromhencethat there is an eternall punishment reserved for the wicked after deathwhere there is no place either for amendmentor example. Some resolve thisobjection by answeringThat Godwhom no law restrainsrefers all to hisglorybut that man must not doe so; as if God sought his glory(that is tosay) pleased himselfe in the death of a sinner. It is more rightly answeredthat the institution of eternall punishment was before sinand had regard tothis onelythat men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come.

X. The words of Christ prove this seventhMatth. 5. 22. But I sayunto youThat whosoever is angry with his brother without a causeshall be indanger of the judgementand whosoever shall say unto his Brother Rachashallbe in danger of the Counsellbut whosoever shall saythou fooleshall be indanger of hell fire. Prov. 10. 18. Hee that uttereth a slander is a foole. Prov.14. 21. Hee that despiseth his neighboursinneth. 15. 1. Grievous words stir upanger. Prov. 22. 10. Cast out the scornerand contention shall goe outandreproach shall cease.

XI. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of naturethat isof humilityis established by these places. Mat. 5. 3. Blessed are the Poor inspiritfor theirs is the Kingdom of heaven. Prov. 6. 1619. These six thingsdoth the Lord hateyea seven are an abomination unto him: A proud look&c.Prov. 16. 5. Every one that is proud is an abomination unto the Lordthoughhand joyne in handhe shall not be unpunished. 11. 2. When pride comeththencometh shamebut with the lowlyis wisdome. Thus Isay 40. 3. (where thecomming of the Messias is shewed forthfor preparation towards his Kingdome)The voyce of him that cryed in the wildernessewas this: Prepare ye the way ofthe Lordmake strait in the desart a high way for our God. Every valley shallbe exaltedand every mountainand hillshall be made low; which doubtlesse isspoken to menand not to mountains.

XII. But that same Equity which we proved in the ninth place to bea Law of Naturewhich commands every man to allow the same Rights to othersthey would be allowed themselvesand which containes in it all the other Lawesbesidesis the same which Moses sets downLevit. 19. 18. Thou shalt love thyneighbour as thy self; and our Saviour calls it the summe of the morall LawMat. 22. 36. Masterwhich is the great Commandement in the Law? Jesus said untohimThou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heartand with all thysouland with all thy mind; this is the first and great Commandementand thesecond is like unto itThou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these twoCommandements hang all the Law and the Prophets. But to love our neighbor as ourselvesis nothing elsebut to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves.

XIII. By the tenth Law respect of Persons is forbid; as also bythese places followingMat. 5. 45. That ye may be children of your Father whichis in Heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the Evilland on the Good&c. Collos. 3. 11. There is neither Greeknor JewcircumcisionnoruncircumcisionBarbarianor Scythianbondor freebut Christ is all&in all. Acts 10. 34. of a truthI perceivethat God is no respecter ofPersons. 2 Chron. 19. 7. There is no iniquity with the Lord our Godnor respectof Personsnor taking of gifts. Ecclus. 35. 12. The Lord is Judgeand with himis no respect of Persons. Rom. 2. 11. For there is no respect of Persons withGod.

XIV. The eleventh Lawwhich commands those things to be held incommon which cannot be dividedI know not whether there be any expresse placein Scripture for itor not; but the practise appears every where in the commonuse of WelsWayesRiverssacred things&c. for else men could not live.

XV. We said in the twelfth placethat it was a Law of NatureThat where things could neither be dividednor possess'd in commonthey shouldbe dispos'd by lotwhich is confirmed as by the example of Moseswho by GodscommandNumb. 34. divided the severall parts of the land of promise unto theTribes by Lot: So Acts I. 24. by the example of the Apostleswho receiv'dMatthiasbefore Justusinto their numberby casting LotSand sayingThouLordwho knowest the hearts of all menshew whether of these two thou hastchosen&c. Prov. 16. 33. The lot is cast into the lappebut the wholedisposing thereof is of the Lord. And which is the thirteenth LawtheSuccession was due unto Esauas being the First-born of Isaacif himself hadnot sold it(Gen. 25. 30.) or that the Father had not otherwise appointed.

XVI. Saint Paul writing to the CorinthiansEpist. 1. Chap. 6.reprehends the Corinthians of that City for going to Law one with another beforeinfidell Judges who were their enemiescalling it a faultthat they would notrather take wrongand suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is againstthat Lawwhereby we are commanded to be helpful to each other. But if it happenthe Controversie be concerning things necessarywhat is to be done? Thereforethe ApostleVer. 5. speaks thusI speak to your shame. Is it so that there isnot one wise man among younonot one that shall be able to judge between hisbrethren? He thereforeby those words confirmes that Law of Nature which wecall'd the fifteenthto witWhere Controversies cannot be avoidedthere bythe consent of Parties to appoint some Arbiterand him some third man; so as(which is the 16 Law) neither of the Parties may be judge in his own Cause.

XVII. But that the Judgeor Arbitermust receive no reward forhis Sentence(which is the 17. Law) appearsExod. 23. 8. Thou shalt take nogift; for the gift blindeth the wiseand perverteth the words of the righteous.Ecclus. 20. 29. Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Whence itfollowesthat he must not be more oblig'd to one part then the otherwhich isthe 19. Lawand is also confirm'dDeut. 1. 17. Ye shall not respect Persons inJudgmentye shall hear the small as well as the great; and in all those placeswhich are brought against respect of Persons.

XVIII. That in the judgement of Factwitnesses must be had(which is the 18. Law) the Scripture not only confirmesbut requires more thenoneDeut. 17. 6. At the mouth of two witnessesor three witnessesshall hethat is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeatedDeut. 19. 15.

XIX. Drunkennessewhich we have therefore in the last placenumbred among the breaches of the Naturall Lawbecause it hinders the use ofright Reasonis also forbid in sacred Scripture for the same reason. Prov. 20.1. Wine is a mockerstrong drink is ragingwhosoever is deceived thereby isnot wise. And Chap. 31. 45. It is not for Kings to drink winelest theydrinkand forget the Lawand pervert the judgement of any of the afflicted:but that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally inthe quantity of the drinkbut in that it destroyes Judgement and Reasonitfollowes in the next VerseGive strong drink to him that is ready to perishand wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let him drinkand forget his povertyand remember his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason in prohibitingdrunkenesseLuk. 21. 34. Take heed to your selveslest at any time your heartsbe overcharg'd with surfetting and drunkennesse.

XX. That we said in the foregoing ChapterThe Law of Nature iseternallis also prov'd out of the fifth of S. Matth. 18. Verily I say untoyoutill Heaven and Earth Passeone jotor one tittleshall in no wise Passefrom the Lawand Psal. 119. v. 160. Every one of thy righteous judgementsendureth for ever.

XXI. We also saidThat the Lawes of Nature had regard chieflyunto Conscience; that isthat he is justwho by all possible endeavour strivesto fulfill them. And although a man should order all his actions (so much asbelongs to externall obedience) just as the Law commandsbut not for the Lawessakebut by reason of some punishment annext unto itor out of Vain gloryyethe is unjust. Both these are proved by the Holy Scriptures. The firstEsay 55.7. Let the wicked forsake his wayand unrighteous man his thoughtsand let himreturn unto the Lordand he wil have mercy upon himand to our Godfor hewill abundantly pardon. Ezek. 18. 31. Cast away from you all your transgressionswhereby you have transgressed& make you a new heartand a new spirit; forwhy will you die O house of Israel? By whichand the like placeswe maysufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds whose heart isright. The second out of the 29. of Isay 13. The Lord saidForasmuch as thispeople draw near me with their mouthand with their lips doe honour mebuthave removed their heart far from metherefore I will proceed&c. Mat. 5.20. Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteousnesse of the Scribesand Pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; and in thefollowing verses our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God arebrokennot by Deeds onlybut also by the Will; for the Scribes and Pharisesdid in outward act observe the Law most exactlybut for Glories sake onely;else they would as readily have broken it. There are innumerable places ofScripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts the Will for theDeedand that as well in goodas in evill actions.

XXII. That the Law of Nature is easily keptChrist himselfdeclares in the 11. Chapter of Saint Matthew 282930. Come unto me&c.Take my yoke upon youand learn of me&c. for my yoke is easieand myburthen light.

XXIII. Lastlythe Rule by which I said any man might know whetherwhat he was doingwere contrary to the Lawor notto witwhat thou wouldstnot be done todoe not that to anotheris almost in the self same wordsdelivered by our SaviourMat. 7. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye wouldthat men should do unto youdo you even so to them.

XXIV. As the law of nature is all of it Divineso the Law ofChrist by conversion(which is wholly explain'd in the 56and 7. Chapter ofS. Matthewes Gospell) is all of it also (except that one Commandement of notmarrying her who is put away for adulterywhich Christ brought for explicationof the divine positive Lawagainst the Jeweswho did not rightly interpret theMosaicall Law) the doctrine of Nature: I say the whole Law of Christ isexplain'd in the fore-named Chaptersnot the whole Doctrine of Christ; forFaith is a part of Christian Doctrinewhich is not comprehended under the titleof a Law; for Lawes are madeand givenin reference to such actions as followour willnot in order to our OpinionsandBelief which being out of ourpowerfollow not the Will.




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